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ABSTRACT 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CURRENT EXPERIENCES OF SYRIAN 
REFUGEES LIVING IN TURKEY AND POLITICAL RADICALIZATION 
 
 
M.A. Thesis, September 2016 
 
Thesis Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Ateş Altınordu 
Keywords: refugee, radicalization, assimilation, integration, belonging, grievances, 
identity 
 
In my thesis, I discuss the mass migration of Syrian refugees to Turkey as a result 
of the civil war in Syria at the start of 2011. The Syrian civil war has become the 
largest global conflict in the contemporary international arena and accounts as 
Turkey’s largest influx of refugees in its modern history. The complexity of factors 
involved in the experiences of Syrian refugees including assimilation, integration, 
belonging, traumas, grievances, and identities in their host country would be 
indicative of political radicalization as suggested by mainstream literature in the 
field. However, the results of the semi-structured, open-ended interviews I 
conducted on Syrian refugees living in Turkey contradict the contemporary 
theories on radicalization involved in the development of radical ideologies and 
violent radical actions. The ways Syrian refugees perceive their experience with 
the Turkish government and society is pivotal to the overall findings of this 
research as is the role of the media’s portrayal of Syrians in Turkey. Thus, the 
overall goal of this research is to provide new insights and contribute to the 
ongoing study of radicalization by asking whether or not the current experiences of 
Syrian refugees living in Turkey will lead to their political radicalization.  
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ÖZET 
 
 
TÜRKİYE’DE YAŞAYAN SURİYELİ MÜLTECİLERİN MEVCUT DENEYİMLERİ 
İLE SİYASİ RADİKALLEŞME ARASINDAKİ İLİŞKİ 
 
 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Eylül 2016 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ateş Altınordu 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Mülteci, Radikalleşme, Asimilasyon, Entegrasyon, Aidiyet, Şikayet, 
Kimlik 
 
 
Tezimde, 2011 yılında Suriye’de başlayan ve uluslararası alanda günümüzün en büyük 
küresel anlaşmazlığı kabul edilen Suriye iç savaşı sonucunda Suriyeli mültecilerin, 
modern tarihindeki en büyük göç akınını alan Türkiye’ye toplu halde zorunlu göçlerini 
ele aldım. Suriyeli mültecilerin zorunlu göç ettikleri ülkedeki deneyimlerini 
şekillendiren asimilasyon, entegrasyon, aidiyet, travmalar, şikayet, ve kimlik gibi 
faktörlerin karmaşıklığının, siyasi radikalleşme için bir gösterge olabileceği bu alanda 
yapılan temel çalışmalarda ortaya atılmaktadır. Ancak, Türkiye’de yaşayan Suriyeli 
mültecilerle yapmış olduğum yarı-resmi, ucu açık mülakatların sonucunun, radikal 
ideolojiler ve şiddet içeren radikal eylemler ile ilgili mevcut teoriler ile çeliştiği ortaya 
çıkmaktadır. Suriyeli mültecilerin Türkiye hükümeti ve halkıyla olan deneyimlerinin 
yanı sıra, medyanın Suriyeli mültecileri lanse ediş biçimleri de bu araştırmanın kilit 
bulgularındandır. Böylece, bu araştırmanın genel amacı, radikalleşme ile ilgili devam 
eden çalışmalara katkıda bulunup yeni bir anlayış sağlayabilmek ile birlikte Türkiye’de 
yaşayan Suriyeli mültecilerin mevcut deneyimlerinin siyasi radikalleşmeye çevirip 
çevirmeyeceği sorusuna cevap aramaktır. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 
 
For years, the international community has been trying to answer the question as 
to why individuals engage in radicalization and transcend into violent radicalization. 
My research puts these theories on radicalization to the test by juxtaposing them to 
interviewed Syrian refugees and their experiences living in Turkey. Radicalization, 
theorists claim, can occur in any society and common themes exist to identify 
radicalized individuals. Some of these themes include a perceived lack of opportunities 
in their society and exclusion from which hatred can grow quickly as radical ideology 
plays on the notion of grievances, transforming grievances into action (Peter Neumann 
2015). Whether or not radicalization in Turkey is taking place, it is an important 
contemporary issue because if Syrian refugees are becoming radicalized due to the 
conditions in their host country, Turkey will be a primary exporter of newly radicalized 
individuals to the international arena (Alabbasi 2015). 
Currently, nearly 3 million Syrian refugees out of the 5 million displaced by the 
war in Syria are situated in Turkey (UNHCR 2016). As the largest country with an 
ongoing influx of Syrians and a growing population boom of over 150,000 Syrian 
babies (Hürriyet Daily News 2016d), Turkey is involved in a new dimension of internal 
hostilities in the region. The Syrian civil war’s protracted conflict in the region is 
responsible for the ongoing waves of refugees into Turkey, proving challenging in terms 
of assimilation and integration as resentments of local Turkish citizens are sprouting 
into violent riots across the country (Kutahyali 2014; Motlagh 2015). The effects 
resulting from the unprecedented numbers of Syrian migrants exponentially pouring 
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into the country have given rise to anti-immigration and anti-Arab sentiments among 
the Turkish public (Özden 2013).  
The Syrian conflict is havocked by radicalized groups that include Syrians living 
in Syria, and muhajereen (foreign fighters) from Iraq, Jordan, North Africa, the 
Caucasus, and other European Muslims who support Syria’s historically radical Salafi 
ideologies (Al-Rawi et al 2015). Salafism, Al-Rawi et al (2015) explains, are in support 
of “exporting jihad to countries in which Muslims were repressed, including their own 
countries” (p. 45). However, the Syrian refugee population in Turkey does not typically 
account as the aforementioned group, having not engaged in radical activity in their host 
country. Instead, the profiles of Syrian refugees in Turkey are not of a homogenous 
group of people; they encompass a vast array of demographics, exposed to events that 
have forever altered their perceptions on life and played a significant role in molding 
their identity. From the means of transportation into Turkey to the living conditions in 
their host country, the processes that Syrian refugees undergo and how they reflect on 
their stories are integral to the overall understanding of this thesis.  
The ways in which Syrian refugees perceive and reflect on their experiences and 
adapt to their traumas and grievances is central to this research as it asks the question 
whether obstacles in their process of integration into Turkish society could lead to 
radicalization. Therefore, this research advances the thesis that the refugee crisis in 
Turkey entails a unique set of elements that could allow for political radicalization to 
sprout and develop quicker within the minds of Syrian refugees than it would in 
different cases. In addition, common attitudes of those who have been radicalized in 
other contexts are compared to the findings of the interviews I conducted to assess the 
correlation with contemporary radicalization theories. 
Turkey’s current geographical, social, political, and economic landscape 
contains some of the basic ingredients for radicalization to develop. To fully analyze 
these elements, I will briefly outline the framework that this thesis will follow. In the 
following subchapters, I will discuss the research methodology used to interview Syrian 
refugees living in Turkey and how this particular design is effective for the case of 
Turkey. I will also provide a quick overview of my thesis. In Chapter 2, I introduce the 
theoretical perspectives of radicalization by highlighting on the shift from classical 
theories to contemporary ones through new research within the international arena. In 
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Chapter 3, I provide a brief synopsis of radical activities that have and are taking place 
in Syria and Turkey, emphasizing on the significant role they play in the experiences of 
Syrian refugees. Additionally, I incorporate the sorts of traumatic events that Syrian 
refugees have undergone both in Syria and in Turkey that have led to grievances. 
In Chapter 4, I elaborate on the role of the media, both at the domestic and 
international level, across news and social media platforms and convey how Syrians 
perceive their sense of assimilation, integration, and belonging and the relationship 
between these attitudes and the development of radical ideologies. The chapter is 
divided into three subchapters that focus on Syrian refugee’s legal status, employment, 
and educational opportunities. In Chapter 5, in light of the aforementioned results, I 
discuss the process of identity formation taking place in Turkey. Finally, I conclude 
with an overall review of the concluding analyses in Chapter 6. 
 
 
 
1.2 Research Methodology 
 
 
 
Aside from theoretical findings, this thesis took on a comprehensive qualitative 
methodology using a semi-structured and open-ended interview format on Syrian 
refugees. Throughout my interviews I used tape-recording and, where necessary, Leyla 
Neyzi’s (2010) techniques on oral history transcription which compensates for what 
Weiss (1995) describes as the loss of “vividness of speech” when “conversational 
spacers are dropped in note taking (and) respondents’ false starts and stray thoughts and 
parenthetic remarks” disappear (p.54). The series of open-ended questions (see 
appendices) served as a guide to later assess the conversations and determine if a 
relationship exists between Syrian’s experience in Turkey and the formation of radical 
ideologies.  
Primarily because radicalization is a phenomenon that goes through a process, 
the interview questions were constructed diachronically, which consists of reports that 
“begin at the beginning and proceed from there (and) tell the stories in which things 
happen as time goes on” (Weiss 1995, p.42). This technique was used to understand the 
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experiences of Syrian refugees in chronological order from the phases reflecting their 
stories of assimilation, integration, belonging, traumas, grievances and identity that 
occurred before, during, and after the Syrian conflict. 
Given the ever-changing dynamic of the Syrian refugee crisis in Turkey, 
conducting semi-structured qualitative interviews with refugees proved crucial to attain 
the most current developments on sentiments related to experiences. Considering the 
difficulty to attain a group of Syrian refugees willing to speak in English about their 
plight out of Syria, their current experiences in Turkey, and government restrictions on 
academic research on Syrian refugees, my thesis began with snowball sampling (Weiss 
1995). The snowball sampling technique took effect from the first individual I 
interviewed who then served as a referral to the next interviewee and so forth. 
Therefore, my sample began as Weiss (1995) explains, as a convenience sample or 
“pretty much whomever we can get…in attempting to learn about a group difficult to 
penetrate (since) it can be a breakthrough to find any member of the group willing to 
serve as an informant and respondent” (p. 24-25). 
The way in which individuals internalize and make sense of their assimilation 
process in their new lives in Turkey as refugees is vital to understanding how 
radicalization may find its way into the mind and can create significantly transitional 
processes within Syrian refugees in Turkey. That is why a qualitative study with Syrian 
refugees in Turkey for this thesis served best because, as Weiss explains, “in a 
qualitative study anyone who has anything to teach us is a desirable interviewee” (p.29). 
 
 
 
1.3  Interviewees 
 
 
 
The individuals with whom I conducted semi-structured interviews are not only 
at different levels of transitioning their life into Turkey but also range across various 
demographics; however, none of the interviewees are residing, have resided, in refugee 
camps. It was important to conduct interviews with Syrians living in the cities of Turkey 
since only 10 percent of the total amount of Syrian refugees in Turkey reside in camps 
(Kirişci and Ferris 2015). Overall, I conducted a total of 15 interviews with Syrian 
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refugees living in the cities of Istanbul and Gaziantep. Rather than conducting 
interviews in cities such as Samsun or Sivas which hosts no more than 5,000 Syrian 
refugees (WHO 2016), I have chosen Gaziantep and Istanbul because they are 
indicators to the dense diffusion of Syrian refugees in Turkey. In May 2016, World 
Health Organization (WHO) reported that Gaziantep and Istanbul alone host 
approximately 400,000 to 800,000 Syrian refugees (WHO 2016). 
Each interview’s duration ranged between one hour to two hours depending on 
the flow of the conversation and the respondents were interviewed more than once, 
some three times if needed. As Weiss (1995) suggests “it is almost always desirable, if 
time and costs permit, to interview respondents more than once” because the first 
interview is dedicated mostly to “establishing the research partnership” (p.57). A third 
interview is also suggested with the same respondent if the interviewee is in need of 
completing other undiscussed areas of research (Weiss 1995, p.57). From these 
interviews, a total of five took place in Istanbul and ten in Gaziantep within an eight-
month period between November 2015 to July 2016. 
My interviewees included both females and males, originally from the Syrian 
cities of Deir Ezzor, Damascus, and Aleppo. The age peripherals ranged from early 20s 
to early 30s and included diverse financial situations as well as marital statuses. The 
individuals I interviewed are, along with other Syrian refugees living in Turkey, a group 
that does not typically engage in radical politics. Each individual’s story was recorded 
through audio and their identities remain anonymous. The educational background and 
academic levels among the interviewees range from Bachelors degrees to Masters and 
includes individuals from the fields of English literature, architecture, electrical 
engineering, international development, dental technician, and others. An important 
note to make is that the majority of the individuals interviewed carried politically active 
lives in Syria throughout the revolution and continue to express these views in Turkey, 
although not engaging in protests.  
 
 
 
1.4 Strengths and Weaknesses 
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The research methodology used for this thesis did present various merits and 
constraints which ought to be discussed. Firstly, the advantages of a qualitative study 
that uses an open-ended interviewing technique include “permitting the respondent to 
talk about what the respondent wants to talk about, as long as it is anywhere near the 
topic of the study, (which) will always produce better data than plodding adherence to 
the guide” (Weiss 2015, p. 49). Another strength in the methodology I chose for my 
thesis was the use of tape-recording as discussed above. The advantages of tape 
recording are that the interviewer can dedicate their full attention to the interviewee 
without having to “worry about getting down all the respondent’s words… (or to) miss 
a good part of what follows” (Weiss 1995, p. 54). 
In terms of weaknesses, perhaps the most debilitating limitation in the scope of my 
interviews was language. The fact that I do not speak Arabic bounded me to conduct all 
my interviews in English since I did not use translators. The language barrier certainly 
prevented me from reaching an audience of a lower educational strata who did not or 
were not able to develop an additional language such as English. The drawback of 
language led me to experience yet another important limitation that I would experience 
throughout the course of the interviews I conducted. This limitation was that of being 
bounded by one respondent’s referral which ultimately led me to a similar network of 
respondents. 
There are several disadvantages that Weiss (1995) warns when using a convenience 
sample based on snowballing. For instance, in my thesis Syrian refugees share the same 
narrative of those who have escaped war from Syria and have taken refuge in Turkey. 
Secondly, when conducting interviews, Syrian refugees may also “be able to judge the 
extent to which others in their situations behave similarly or differently and have the 
same or different experiences” (p. 26). This is primarily because of the isolation and the 
production of Syrian refugee communities across Turkey that circulate information 
between their communities and create a common narrative across the refugees. 
Likewise, Syrian refugees’ experiences may include the “same behavior from any other 
group with the same dynamics and the same constraints” (p.27) and because of 
snowballing, the Syrians I interviewed may be representative of “those who have few 
social contacts and will therefore underrepresent every belief and experience that is 
associated with having few social contacts” (p.27). 
 7 
Finally, although using a tape-recorder does come with its benefits as discussed 
above, it also presents key issues with how the interviewees talk about their stories. 
Weiss (1995) claims that tape-recorders “remind people that there will be a record of 
what they say” and “they can feel constrained by its presence” (p. 53). Another 
disadvantage of using a tape-recorder, was that five of the total interviews were 
conducted through telephone or Skype conversations, which presents some noteworthy 
disadvantages. Firstly, a bad connection on the telephone or Skype cuts off contact, 
resulting in an awkward back and forth attempt to reconnect. As a result of the bad 
connection, it is easier for interviewees to either delay the interview for another time or, 
as Weiss (1995) reveals, avoid continuing the interview altogether. Secondly, the 
absence of a face-to-face conversation between the interviewer and interviewee leads to 
a disconnected relationship that “generally produces a shorter interview” (Weiss 1995, 
p. 59).  
 
 
 
1.5 Overview 
 
 
 
All in all, the main argument of my thesis looks at the relationship between the 
current experiences of Syrian refugees in Turkey and political radicalization. 
Contemporary literature on radicalization would suggest that Syrian refugees, as mass 
migrants into Turkey exposed to a complex landscape of experiences including 
grievances to a politicized environment, social isolation and exclusion, discrimination, 
perceived relative deprivation, identity crises, and traumas, would be vulnerable to and 
ultimately become radicalized by these experiences. However, the findings from the 
interviews I conducted on Syrian refugees shows that even though these individuals are 
exhibiting all the aforementioned sentiments, they have not become radicalized, thus 
contradicting the mainstream literature on radicalization.  
If the current literature claims that individuals in these circumstances do 
radicalize yet Syrian refugees have not, then there is a gap in the research that needs to 
be discussed within the case of Turkey. Therefore, I will discuss how Syrians are 
experiencing their transition into Turkey and what sorts of factors have led the large 
population in Turkey to exhibit these sentiments but not turn to radicalization. Thus, the 
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overarching goal of this thesis is to provide new insights that expose the relationship 
between the current experiences of Syrian refugees living in Turkey and their political 
radicalization as incongruent. 
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CHAPTER 2:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
 
2.1 What is Radicalization? 
 
 
 
The radicalization process, complex in its development from ideas to action, 
involves a web of factors extending to vast outcomes, stretching its reach from the 
individual level to small groups, communities and organized systems at internal to 
external scopes. Radicalization takes shape in different forms across the globe, neither 
the individuals, their backgrounds, motives, country of birth nor residence can be 
transcribed into a single framework. Although definitions of radicalization range across 
a multitude of fields, understanding the different interpretations of radicalization is 
integral to determining whether or not these processes are taking shape in Turkish 
communities hosting Syrian refugees. 
The processes of radicalization are, as Magnus Ranstorp (2010) suggests, a 
“multifaceted combination of push-pull factors involving a combination of socio-
psychological factors, political grievance, religious motivation and discourse, identity 
politics and triggering mechanisms” (p. 6). Similarly, Mastors and Siers (2014) add that 
since multiple phases of radicalization exist, an extensive examination of the processes 
are recommended since “indoctrination occurs over a period of time” (p. 378). Wilner et 
al (2011) also view radicalization as a gradual process, one that does not develop 
overnight nor in a few days, instead, it is mental process from which the 
“deconstruction and reconstruction of meaning perspectives” occur (Wilner et al 2011). 
Mark Sedgwick (2010) interprets radicalization as a confusing and complex 
term because it is typically “used in three different contexts: the security context, the 
 10 
integration context, and the foreign-policy context” (p. 479). Within the security 
context, radicalization is defined as “a direct or indirect threat to the security of the state 
or of individual citizens of the state” (p. 485) and “draws the line between ‘moderate’ 
and ‘radical’ in the light of concerns with direct or indirect threats to the security of the 
state or of individual citizens of the state” (p. 490). Radicalization within the integration 
definition is understood as a “social phenomenon with ideological and political 
consequences” (p. 486) and “draws the line in the light of concerns about citizenship, 
including cultural issues” (p. 490). The foreign-policy definition of radicalization 
defines the term both within the security context and that of the government as a “threat 
to their continued control of state power” (p. 487) and “considers the agendas of other 
governments when drawing its line, resulting in the classification as ‘radical’ of stances 
that would not otherwise be of concern for either the (domestic) security agenda or the 
integration agenda” (p. 491). 
Veldhuis and Staun (2009) also distinguish a split in defining radicalization and 
identify the term in two different ways: violent radicalization and a broader sense of 
radicalization.  As for violent radicalization, “emphasis is put on the active pursuit or 
acceptance of the use of violence to attain the stated goal”, whereas the broader sense of 
radicalization emphasizes “the active pursuit or acceptance of far- reaching changes in 
society, which may or may not constitute a danger to democracy and may or may not 
involve the threat of or use of violence to attain the stated goals” (Velduis and Staun 
2009, p.4) 
Clark McClauley and Sophia Moskalenko (2008) define political radicalization 
as a “dimension of increasing extremity of beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in support of 
intergroup conflict and violence” (p. 415) and as a “change in beliefs, feelings, and 
behaviors in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand 
sacrifice in defense of the ingroup” (p.416). McClauley and Moskalenko (2008) also 
emphasize the role of social groups for radicalization, in particular, radicalized 
individuals would engage in such violent actions with the following group think: “we 
are a special or chosen group (superiority) who have been unfairly treated and betrayed 
(injustice), no one else cares about us or will help us (distrust), and the situation is 
dire—our group and our cause are in danger of extinction (vulnerability)” (p.416). 
Therefore, social networks and the development of group identification plays an 
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important role in the radicalization of individuals.  
Fathali M. Moghaddam (2005) suggests to view the process of radicalization as 
a staircase, whereby individuals start to develop radical ideologies from the ground 
floor and engage in violent radical actions at the last floor of the building. In this 
respect, the ground floor is fundamental for the development of radical ideologies 
within individuals because it is “where what matters most are perceptions of fairness 
and just treatment” (p. 162). McGregor et al (2015) define radicalization as a “shift 
from mainstream to anti-normative or comparatively extreme ideological convictions 
that animate eagerness to challenge the status quo” and it “is neither necessarily 
aggressive nor religious” (p. 7) McGregor et al (2015) pay particular attention to the 
role of personality and threat as factors influencing individuals to engage in radical 
behavior: 
• The personality factor: 
o Aggression (disagreeableness, hostility, anger, narcissism, or 
low self-control); 
o High BIS personality traits that incline people toward the 
experience of anxiety; 
o Identity-weak personality traits that undermine capacity to assert 
personal value priorities, take initiative, or maintain self-
regulatory control 
• The threat factor: 
o External control threats that undermine faith in the social system 
(that identity-weak people are especially inclined to rely on; 
o Life circumstances that underscore hopelessness (p. 7). 
Sedgwick (2015) makes an important contribution when he distinguishes 
between the definitions of radicalism and activism. Activism, Sedgwick (2015) argues, 
is defined as ‘‘readiness to engage in legal and non-violent political action’’ while 
radicalism is defined as ‘‘readiness to engage in illegal and violent political action’’ (p. 
483). Therefore, radicalization follows an agenda that delineates a breach of legality and 
the use of violence. 
While individuals engaged in political radicalization seem to share similar 
features to those involved in political activism, such as the deep desire to make a 
notable change in their society, “collective identification” with a group which leads to 
“collective action” (Sturmer and Simon 2004), the two concepts are vastly different in 
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practice. McCauley and Moskalenko (2010) distinguish the two concepts best by 
defining activism as “the movement of individuals and groups to legal and nonviolent 
political action” while radicalism is defined as “illegal and violent political action” (p. 
82).  
Unlike radicalization, activism does not involve an identity crisis, instead Bardi 
et al (2014) explain that activists’ “basic values are typically quite stable across time 
(Schwartz, 2006), changing little even in the face of many life transitions”. This is 
primarily because political activism has a temporal tendency and is “often situational 
and episodic, depending on the salience of particular political issues” (Vecchione et al 
2015, p. 87)   
The role of education is also an important factor in motivating individuals to 
partake in political activism as it “provides citizens with the cognitive resources to 
participate effectively in politics” (Verba et al 1995). In radicalization, individuals tend 
to disintegrate, ultimately moving away from society and becoming more involved in 
radical ideologies. In sharp contrast to radicalism, political activism focuses on the 
movement of individuals towards social community movements, by “becoming more 
integrated into the community, increas(ing) their social and political ties, get(ting) more 
experienced in the political domain, and thus acquir(ing) more resources and 
opportunities for political activism” (Vecchione et al 2015, p. 87). 
Finally, although the amount of literature available on radicalization is quite 
substantial, Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen’s (2010) definitions serves as guide. Therefore, a 
radical in this thesis is understood as a “person harboring deep-felt desire for 
fundamental sociopolitical changes,” and radicalization is defined as “growing 
readiness to pursue and support far-reaching changes in society that conflict with or 
pose a direct threat to the existing order” (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010, p. 798). In its most 
extreme stage, violent radicalization is to be understood as the “process in which radical 
ideas are accompanied by the development of a willingness to directly support or 
engage in violent acts” (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010, p. 798).  
 
 
 
2.2 Classical and Contemporary Theories on Radicalization 
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It wasn’t until the late 20th century that the study of radicalization began to focus 
on personality and social psychological empirical research (McGregor et al 2015). The 
findings suggested that a direct correlation existed between the decision to engage in 
radical actions and “threats to a psychological resource (esteem, security, integrity, 
immortality, belongingness, meaning, or control)” (McGregor et al 2015). 
Building upon Sigmeund Freud’s classical theories on psychoanalysis, Lewin 
(1933) conveys theories of motivation and goal regulation that explained how “conflicts 
and uncertainties produce anxious tension that persists as long as goals remain 
impeded”. He argued that if individuals do not have a means to “relieve the tension 
arising from their (often social) conflicts then they escape from the field of tension by 
resorting to fantasy, submission, or belligerence” (Lewin 1933). 
Bhui et al (2014) take on a classical approach to radicalization theory by 
focusing on “the role of mental health issues and social isolation (as they) play a part in 
making certain individuals more vulnerable to extremist propaganda” (p. 2). De Bie et 
al (2014) as social movement theorists argue that grievances, efficacy, identity issues 
and emotions such as fear and anger motivate people to participate in protest groups. 
Social Movement Theory scholars like Quintan Wiktorowicz and network 
theorists such as Marc Sageman make sense of violent radicalization in relation to the 
influence of “small communicative communities” on identity, perceptions, and 
preferences (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010, p. 801). Dalgaard-Nielsen, focusing on the micro 
level, posits that radical ideas are spread by people you know directly, found within 
small groups of people who are able to create tight-knit bonds, peer pressure, and 
indoctrinate a radicalized perception. 
Despite the multitude of research conducted on the study of radicalization, “even 
profiles, root causes, individual characteristics, personal qualities, and environmental 
precursors are neither sufficient nor necessary for radicalization to occur” (Wilner and 
Dubouloz 2011, p. 420); instead, it serves as a means to advance knowledge on the 
phenomenon of radicalization.  Thus, interviews with the Syrian community are vital to 
furthering the understanding of how radicalization takes shape in Turkey as “each case 
study of radicalization contributes to the overall understanding of the processes at 
work” (Ranstorp 2010, p. 7).  
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Within the literature on radicalization, social marginalization and social 
exclusion are central themes to be considered in the social integration discourse and are 
juxtaposed by Hornqvist and Flyghed to the exclusion perspective. This perspective 
points to how “conflicts and problems arise when the individual becomes disengaged 
from society and its fundamental values as a result of unemployment or residential 
segregation”. Therefore, the impacts of unemployment and social exclusion can produce 
a “fertile soil for the emergence of (radical) values and behaviours that are very 
different from those of the rest of society” (Hornqvist and Flyghed 2012, p. 323). 
Wilner and Dubouloz (2011) indicate that radicalization occurs when an 
individual internalizes a particular set of ideas within their personal belief system (p. 
420). Radicalization is thus a process that transforms an individuals meaning-
perspective when three underlying factors take place: triggers, change, and outcome 
(Wilner and Dubouloz 2011). The trigger phase occurs when an individual undergoes a 
disorienting event that hinders them from “functioning in habitual ways or in ways they 
desire” and ultimately “propels individuals to question how they are going to live with 
their new realities” resulting in a change in their previously-held belief systems and the 
construction of new meaning perspective (Wilner and Dubouloz 2011). Finally, violent 
radicalization takes full form at the outcome stage when an individual “accepts and 
participates in their new lifestyle…(and) gain(s) new perspectives on life and adhere(s) 
to novel rules of conduct and lifestyle routines” (p.427-431). 
Additionally, Wilner and Dubouloz introduce transformative radicalization to 
explain how alienation and the rejection of foreign policies “shape an individual’s 
personal context of living” and “trigger(s) a transformative learning process” which 
eventually leads to terrorism (Wilner and Dubouloz 2011, p. 423). Elena Mastors and 
Rhea Siers’ case study of Omar al-Hammami’s participation in radical behavior proves 
how crucial the trigger phase serves as an indicator to the development of radicalization. 
The fact that al-Hammami “rejected the society of his youth” (Mastors and Siers 2014, 
p. 384) confirms how rejection and the ultimate alienation from society is at the 
forefront to the development of radical behavior. 
Similarly, Ranstorp emphasizes Tore Bjorgo’s four factors in explaining the 
processes that individuals undergo to radicalize. The four triggers of radicalization are 
related to structural, facilitating, motivational, and triggering causes. Structural causes 
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include factors involving “demographic imbalances, globalization, rapid modernization, 
transitional societies, increased individualism with rootlessness and atomization, 
relative deprivation, class structure” (Ranstorp 2010, p.4). External factors in society, 
Albert Bandura suggests, are essential to the radicalization of individuals, most 
especially for those who “live in violent regions and who witness terrorism regularly 
may seek to imitate terrorists or learn from a culture that glorifies terrorists” 
(Kleinmann 2012, p. 280). 
Although the focus of contemporary discussions on radicalization tends to be on 
the role of religion, individuals engaged in radical activities are “generally ignorant 
about Islam” (Ranstorp 2010, p.7). Interestingly, Scott Matthew Kleinmann’s study on 
83 Sunni Muslims who radicalized in the U.S. put great emphasis on the role of the 
radicalization of individuals through “group-level socialization” rather than grievances 
related to religion. He determined that individuals are drawn to the message of 
radicalization “by movements or radical friends and family members” and not by 
“perceived injustices against Islam, (which) generally play a minor role in 
radicalization” (Kleinmann 2012). The widespread interest in the Muslim versus non-
Muslim narrative (Wiktorowicz 2004) is not of value to this thesis; instead, the role of 
how Syrians and Turks perceive the good Muslim versus bad Muslim (Wiktorowicz 
2004) narrative is of interest.   
Finally, Wiktorowicz (2004) claims that individuals can radicalize if they 
experience a “cognitive openness” or “willingness to be receptive to the (extremist) 
message” due to a “moral shock” resulting in the outbreak of an identity crisis. Whether 
or not individuals are experiencing an identity crisis along these themes as it resonates 
within Turkey’s context of Syrian refugees will be further discussed throughout this 
thesis.  
 
 
2.3 Debunking Classical Theories on Radicalization 
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The topic of radicalization has been at the forefront of contemporary 
international politics, triggering massive interest to conduct research and explain why 
individuals engage in radical action. Marc Sageman (2014) explains that research on 
political violence escalated in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a result of airplane 
hijackings. Researchers raced to find the answers to the conundrum of radicalization, 
affirming that personality factors and mental illness were responsible for violent actions 
(Sageman 2014). However, empirical research later rejected these claims when there 
was no direct correlation to the findings. It was not until the attacks on the Twin Towers 
on September 11, 2001 that researchers began to exponentially revisit the topic of 
political radicalization. The extensive funding granted to researchers by governments to 
identify new intel on the topic of radicalization ultimately led to “lay assumptions and 
understandings of the 9/11 ‘terrorists’” (Sageman 2014, p. 566) that blamed Islam and 
the Quran as the roots of hatred. 
Classical theorists pointed towards psychological factors to explain why 
individuals radicalize, blaming mental illnesses for the participation in acts of violence 
(Silke 2008). For the most part, contemporary research has now moved away from tying 
radicalization to innate psychological imbalances and instead began providing new 
insights into the study of radicalization. Silke, elaborating on this shift, stated that 
individuals who radicalize are “essentially normal individuals” (2008, p. 53), then again 
“normal people can do abnormal things” (Silke 2008, p. 67) such as engaging in non-
violent radical behavior and actions in the form of social movements. 
As is the case of Moghaddam’s (2005) theory discussed above, his stipulation 
for the formation of radicalization is problematic in the Turkish-Syrian case because it 
assumes that if an individual has the characteristics as prescribed on the ground floor, 
then it is inevitable that their final destination is the fifth floor, i.e. radicalization. 
Although Syrians, in theory, contain the prerequisites for radicalization as they share 
sentiments related to social and economic grievances, the interviews I conducted finds 
that they have not radicalized. Thus, contradicting the common narrative outlining the 
formation of radicalization. 
Hiebert and Dawson (2015) explore the common themes of radicalization 
research, drawing attention to the literature pertaining to mental illness, demographic 
profiles, and personality traits. The researchers, basing their references from empirical 
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studies conducted on terrorists by Lyons and Harbinson, Rasch, Sageman, Bakker, and 
Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman, argue that mental illness and terrorism are not 
correlated and instead may even hinder participation in radical activity. However, 
Hiebert and Dawson (2015) also claim that certain demographic profiles are associated 
with radicalization, especially an educated male in a middle to upper class background. 
These vague demographics are also problematic because they attribute radicalization to 
a group of individuals as long as they are indicative of deep-seated resentments. 
Another misconception is the association of the term radicalization with that of 
terrorism. Magnus Hornqvist and Janne Flyghed clarify this fusion by placing terrorism 
at the end of radicalization as an end result.  By doing so, the development of radical 
“opinions, views and ideas” (Hornqvist and Flyghed 2012, p. 321) result in acts of 
violence performed by individuals, i.e. terrorist actions. Someone who is considered a 
“‘radical’ should not necessarily be connoted in negative terms, as it can refer to a 
diverse range of people who are working hard for legitimate causes in their 
communities.” Therefore, it is “important not to equate radicalism with terrorism” 
(Jaffer 2013). Instead, this thesis stresses that the processes through which individuals 
become radicalized are complex and cannot be defined within a linear progress 
(Ranstorp 2010, p. 2).  
Heather Selma Gregg (2014) emphasizes that “not all social movements are 
violent; in fact, many successful movements have been purposefully non-violent, such 
as Gandhi’s Quit India movement, Martin Luther King, Jr.’s U.S. Civil Rights 
Movement, Bishop Desmond Tutu’s non-violent resolution of apartheid, and the Dalai 
Lama’s non-violent protest against Chinese occupation” (p. 6). 
Quite interestingly, Veldhuis and Staun (2009) while analyzing both violent and 
nonviolent radicalization, ultimately criticized the common definition of radicalization 
used by theorists as “a chronological overview of the phases through which people 
progress in a process of radicalization” (p. 61). The phases, Veldhuis and Staun (2009) 
criticize: 
“Suffer from a selection bias due to the fact that they focus only on 
successful cases of radicalisation. The phases they describe are presumed to 
be related only to violent radicalisation, but can also be associated with 
other, counter- suggestive outcomes like non-violent radicalisation or no 
radicalisation at all… as a result of this selection bias with regard to only 
cases of violent radicalisation, phase models run the risk of wrongfully 
 18 
categorising groups of people who share certain characteristics or forms of 
behaviour as potentially dangerous radicals. The phases are identified by 
vaguely defined features which can be interpreted in different ways and do 
not necessarily have to be a cue for radicalisation, let alone for upcoming 
violence” (p.61-62). 
 
As Wilner and Duboulouz also explain, “not all radicalization is necessarily 
negative, nor does radicalization necessarily lead to violence. There are ‘different forms 
of radicalization’” and different ways to go about them. Instead, Wilner and Duboloz 
state that radicalized individuals “are not a security problem, until (actions) take on 
intolerant, segregate attitudes or promotes the use of violence” (Wilner and Dubouloz 
2011, p. 420). Therefore, an individual’s engagement in radical ideology is not 
indicative to the participation in violent action at a later stage.  
Mastors and Siers even claim that theories on radicalization do not exist; instead, 
there are “large and fragmented bod(ies) of literature relevant to the study of 
radicalization (Mastors and Siers 2014, p. 378). Therefore, it is important to understand 
radicalization as a non-sequential pattern, by which internal and external factors are in 
constant motion. The role of these internal and external factors are to be discussed with 
further detail within the scope of Chapter 4, 5, 6, and 7. In all, these theories will be 
juxtaposed to the responses of interviewed Syrian refugees living in Turkey to 
determine if radical attitudes are present and are likely to lead to radical attitudes. 
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CHAPTER 3: RADICAL ACTIVITY & TRAUMAS AND GRIEVANCES 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Radical Activity 
 
 
 
Syria and Turkey have been through a series of noteworthy radical activities and 
dynamics that make for the Syrian refugee case in Turkey a delicate web to dissect in 
terms of the processes of radicalization. Therefore, a brief description of the radical 
activities taking place in Syria and Turkey is essential to fully understanding whether or 
not there is a relationship between radical attitudes and Syrian refugees living in 
Turkey. 
 
 
 
3.1 (a) Syria 
 
 
Syria, prior to the revolution, was a diverse country ethnically and religiously 
mixed with Muslim and Christian communities (Khatib 2015). In the 1930s, the 
establishment of political parties in Syria “advocating progressive political or social 
changes” brought about the Syrian Nationalist Party (PPS), the Syrian Communist 
Party, the League for National Action, and the Arab Resurrection Party (Ba’ath) (Maoz 
and Yaniv 2013). The parties’ collective message called for “national independence, 
social (or socialist) and economic reform, and secularization of public life” (Maoz and 
Yaniv 2013). The Ba’ath party, in particular, gained power through the “socio-
economic unrest among peasants and workers, as well as the political grievances and 
aspirations of the middle class”. Ultimately, the Ba’ath party took power on March 1963 
in a coup d’état (Khatib 2015) which led the country into “radical, extensive 
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reforms…(and) are undoubtedly leading Syria towards a social-political revolution” 
(Maoz and Yaniv 2013). 
 The power of the Assad regime ruling from 1971 with President Hafez al-Assad 
to the current President Bashar al-Assad in Syria maintained its command through the 
elimination of Islamic groups and influence of the Alawite families which “had at least 
one member who work(ed) for the military, police, or security forces” (Khatib 2015, p. 
347). Security forces began to take advantage of the state emergency imposed under the 
Assad regime from 1963, which allowed them to “arrest, detain, track down, and 
commit all sorts of human rights violations without questioning” (Khatib 2015, p. 347). 
The Syrian revolution was sparked primarily by anti-government sentiments. 
The Assad regime’s arrest and torture of teenagers who graffitied their school walls 
with revolutionary slogans (Rodgers et al 2016) triggered cognitive openings that 
quickly transcended from radical attitudes to radical behavior and ultimately, radical 
actions. President Bashar al-Assad’s policy of force re-awakened anti-government 
sentiments that played on past grievances from the Assad regime.  
The mass protests that took place in 2011 demanding the resignation of Assad 
resulted in the regime committing brutal war crimes and the use of chemical weapons, 
leading to armed retaliation by opposition groups in Syria (Rodgers et al 2016). The rise 
in armed rebels across different cities in Syria was supported by radical groups seeking 
to exponentially grow members by playing on the narrative of grievances related to the 
“West's inaction” (Rodgers et al 2016) whereby participation in such armed groups 
serves as, Ranstorp proposes, redemption to fill the void of lost loved ones and 
transforming suffering into honor. 
 
We left (Syria) because me and my husband; there, Jabhat al-Nusra 
controlled the city (Deir Ezzor) and moved the Free Army. At first we 
worked as civil activists and they weren’t interrupting us. But after awhile, 
my husband (was) required for investigation from Jabhat al-Nusra. So when 
we heard that, we have a cousin with Jabhat al-Nusra, he told us they 
require you to an investigation, so we just escaped there’s no way to deal 
with them. So, me and him, said we must escape from Syria because it’s too 
much. At that time two of my friends, were working with me in the same 
organization I worked, they wanted to come (to Turkey), we were on a 
project on elections, I wrote to them but after a while they were 
disappeared. I don’t know why. I talked (wrote) to them in the internet, they 
weren’t answering. After a while we heard that when they are in the road to 
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Deir Ezzor they were kidnapped in al Raqqa by ISIS, so we tried our best 
just to know what happened to them but we didn’t know. After a while in the 
news and T.V. they said they murdered them. Because they (ISIS) said it’s a 
blasphemy to work with an American organization, so they murdered them. 
So killing is starting, it’s too much, And Jabhat al-Nusra, Daesh, there’s no 
difference. (4) 
 
 
To this day, Syria continues to be ravaged by different conflicts and controlled 
by notorious radical groups like al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Jabhat al-Nusra, who have taken 
advantage of the revolution to extend their radical activities throughout the country’s 
people and territory. Although these radical groups proclaim their ideologies to be 
vastly different from one another, they share the common goal of discrediting and 
delegitimizing the other as the bad Muslim in order to continue to influence and 
maintain the support of their members. At the other end of the spectrum, the Assad 
regime and the Free Syrian Army share a fight against al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Jabhat al-
Nusra who deem them as “un-Islamic” and “enemies of Allah” given Assad’s 
relationship with Western leaders and the Free Syrian Army’s fondness for democracy 
(Al-Rawi and Jensen 2015, p. 48). 
 
 
 
3.1 (b) Turkey 
 
 
Its geographical position in the world continues to be a critical zone for allied 
partnership between both Western and Arab countries as they maintain military 
presence in stations like Adana’s southeast Incirlik. However, as a member of NATO, 
Turkey has received international criticism at the “ease with which ISIS fighters 
appeared to be able to enter and leave territory held by the group” (Malik et al 2016). 
Therefore, Turkey’s violent political landscape has marked it as a “contemporary 
geographical hub for terrorist acts” (Castro 2016) and has been proclaimed as the 
“jihadi highway” (Candar 2016) for channeling radical groups in and out of its territory. 
Recent surveys have shown that over 2,500 individuals have traveled from 
Turkey to Iraq and Syria to join ISIS. 800 of these individuals even took their families 
with them and over 5,000 radicalized Turks have crossed into Syria (Gürcan 2015). 
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Gürcan also claims that "the real problem is not the ones who go to Syria and Iraq to 
fight, but those who are radicalized and stay here (Turkey)” and “they [number] in the 
thousands” (Gürcan 2015). 
The characteristics of Turkey, without considering the radical activity already 
taking place across the nation, has made it a target for attacks by groups like ISIS. Since 
“Turkey has a strong Islamist core, a majority Sunni population, and a tangibly strong 
Islamic identity and history” along with a democratically elected republic, these 
elements make for a “fertile ground for ISIS’ ambitions” (TBFF 2016) Even Turkey’s 
shift away in the early 20th century from a state dominated by religion, created a conflict 
between “conservative populism and republican nationalism” (Altinordu 2010, p. 518). 
These national and historic events play an important role on how Syrian refugees begin 
to compare life in Turkey to that in Syria in terms of religiosity. Although in Turkey, 
refugees are not exposed to the common narrative of Kafir which means the struggle 
between Muslims against non-Muslims, the discourse of the good conservative Muslim 
versus the bad modern Muslim does exist.  
The radical activity that has dominated Turkey’s political scheme includes 
versatile incidents of radicalization by ISIS, and even the Turkish and Syrian refugee 
community. Al Jazeera reported that “Turkey is facing several security threats. As part 
of a US-led coalition, it is fighting ISIL in neighbouring Syria and Iraq as well as 
Kurdish fighters in its own southeast, where a two-and-a-half-year ceasefire collapsed 
last July, triggering the worst violence since the 1990s” (Al Jazeera 2016). The 
incidents that have unfolded in Turkish territory will be discussed by the groups 
committing them.  
As for cases involving ISIS, concerns continue to grow regarding Turkey’s 
Islamic radicalization at some universities including Istanbul University in 2014 when 
students were attacked for protesting ISIS (Ridgwell 2014). Another concern is the sale 
of “pro-jihadist literature on sale openly on the streets of Istanbul” (Ridgwell 2014). In 
Gaziantep, an ISIS supporter injured five Turkish police officers by detonating 
explosives in his flat as they attempted to infiltrate his operations (Hürriyet Daily News 
2015a). In another tragic incident in Gaziantep, a Syrian pro-opposition journalist was 
killed by ISIS sympathizers (The Guardian 2016). 
Salafi networks in the notorious Hacibayram district uncovered a Turkish 
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defected ISIS fighter who claims that “the Dawlah (ISIS) considers Turkey to be taghut, 
a false idol because it isn’t governed by divine rules (and) a country of blasphemy” 
(Eroğlu 2015). The reasons as to why Turkish youth has resorted to radical ideologies is 
rooted in politics, primarily that with AKP who have “polluted political Islam” (Gürcan 
2015). 
 It is no doubt that with these ideologies there have been a series of attacks by 
ISIS sympathizers in Turkey. On January 2016, a suicide attacker killed 10 foreign 
tourists and injured over 15 (Al Arabiya 2016) at the historic square in Istanbul at the 
Sultanahmet Mosque (Middle East Eye 2016). Shortly afterwards, in January 2016, 
“Turkish police detained some 33 suspected members of the Islamic State of Iraq and 
the Levant (ISIL) during operations in Istanbul and southern Adana province” (Hürriyet 
Daily News 2016b). 
The suicide attacks which ravaged through Istanbul Ataturk Airport on June 
2016 (Tastekin 2016) reverberated not only in Turkey but across the globe, reminding 
the ever real security threats present in the country and the irrelevance of a state’s 
religious piety. When considering the threat of ISIS, security officials in Ankara claim 
that Turkey “doesn’t have a strategic vision for combating ISIS” (Gürcan 2015). 
The radical activity discussed above, although not directly affecting Syrians 
living in Turkey, play an instrumental role in how the refugees come to terms with their 
experiences and the attitudes built thereinafter. Nevertheless, direct incidents have 
occurred between the Turkish and Syrian communities across Turkey which have 
sparked tensions between both sides. As was the case on July 2014, violent riots erupted 
in Gaziantep when Turkish locals protested against refugees in competition for blue-
collar work and resentment for their use of national benefits like healthcare and 
education. (Kutahyali 2014) In the city of Kahramanmaras, roughly 1,000 locals 
marched, demanding that Syrian refugees be sent back to their country (Today’s Zaman 
2014), blaming them for dragging along hardships with them to Turkey as the country 
undergoes a mass influx of refugees. During the holy month of Ramadan, free meals are 
distributed across the country at sunset to celebrate a day of fasting, yet two Turkish 
men in Bingol were video recorded slapping Syrian refugee children as they were 
served their meals (Hürriyet Daily News 2016i). 
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Cumulatively, the highly politicized landscape, ongoing radical activities in 
Turkey, and hostilities between Turkish and Syrian communities make the assimilation 
process for the refugees more difficult and have developed resentments between both 
sides that will be discussed in further detail below. The ever-changing platform in the 
case of Turkey could make Syrian refugees susceptible to radical messages and 
ideologies to that play on the theme of the Syrian grievance in Turkey. The responses 
from the interviews I conducted will be analyzed alongside the themes of assimilation, 
integration, and belonging in relation to the media, legal status, employment, and 
educational opportunities.  
 
 
3.2 TRAUMAS AND GRIEVANCES 
 
 
 
The aftermath of traumatic events results in “psychological consequences (that) 
affect individuals both in ways that are highly personal and in ways that are impersonal, 
transpersonal, collective and social” (Papadopoulous 2006). Among the interviewees in 
my research, every individual has encountered a traumatic experience in Syria that has 
resulted in grievances. Below, an individual reflects on his decision to finally leave 
Syria at the end of 2015 and comparing life in Syria to Turkey: 
 
I was scared. I was hungry actually. Um, I rested. I saw life here (Turkey) is 
going on. We forgot what it was before. A normal day where nobody dies, 
nobody you know, dies. Even death is not that big a deal now for Syrians, 
people die everyday, literally every day. Bomb shelling, mortars, everyday 
in the street, everyday hospitals, everywhere… I... I’m sorry. (3) 
 
Sharika Thiranagama (2013) illustrates how individuals perceive displacement 
as “being trapped in a world not of their own choosing but that which they and their 
bodily and social instincts were undeniably the product of.” As a victim of war, 
individuals perceive these events as qualities that are both “happening to them, as an 
external force” from which they have little control and are “making them” which are 
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enforced by their “communities and families” (Thiranagama 2013). The traumas 
experienced from a lack of integration are expressed below by a Syrian respondent: 
I don’t speak the language, I don’t want to learn Turkish, my license doesn’t 
work for being an architect. Physical hurt isn’t an issue; I don’t belong here 
(Turkey). (3) 
 
The stories that Syrians shared with me on their journey out of Syria and 
arriving to Turkey were never quite the same, but they all exhibited events involving 
traumatic experiences which ultimately led them to reflect on these events with 
grievance. Escaping the war in Syria into Turkey is divided between those who enter 
Turkey legally through means of air, land, or sea; then there are those who have entered 
illegally through land. Before even getting to the border of Turkey, Syrians described 
the traumas they endured on their journey, most of them described themselves as 
internal refugees or internally displaced peoples (IDPs) in Syria. The majority of my 
interviewees came face to face with life-threatening confrontations with radical groups 
in Syria like ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, or for cases involving individuals wanted by their 
government, the worse group to face was the army of the Assad regime as will be 
illustrated in several examples below. 
 
 
 
5.1 Plight out of Syria 
 
 
 
They (Syrians) were wanted by the regime, and if the regime found them 
they would kill them. And a lot of them would say that getting killed is the 
easiest option (rather) than getting arrested, the amount of torture and 
humiliation is unbearable. (1) 
 
The sorts of warfare that civilians endured made them familiar with artillery, 
many militarizing themselves for protection and for a sense of “duty” (1) to oppositional 
groups. The traumas experienced in Syria alone are integral to understanding the 
attempt to transition from war at home to a civilian lifestyle in Turkey. Below is an 
excerpt that describes a crossfire in Deir Ezzor: 
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I remember some of the Free Syrian Army fighters, uhh, even when you 
hear, uhhhh, what do you call that, a battle or something, like, you hear the 
regime, you know the regime side from the bullets that they are firing. It will 
be like “…toot toot toot toot toot”, and you know the Free Syrian Army side 
because they would be like “tat (silence) tat”, they wouldn’t-- they would 
only fire a bullet if they know they would hit one, they didn’t even have 
bullets at that time. (1) 
 
The normalization of fear and death are heavy traumas carried in the Syrian 
migration. As depicted below, a married couple arrive to the Turkish border and explain 
their experience: 
By bus, open-border, we had passports so it was easy but you know the 
crowd was so much on the border it’s just only hard. And our way to Turkey 
it was a lot of conflict (armed), we passed 4 or 5 conflicts by fire on the 
road to Turkey. I remember it was ISIS and the Free Army were fighting at 
some point, I don’t know it was just luck when we passed. (4) 
 
 
 
5.2 Plight into Turkey 
 
 
 
No, I’m not planning to go there (Kilis) because it’s boring and a little 
dangerous, it’s so close to the border. There was this period of time, there 
were mortal shells dropped on Kilis, so we had to put our work on hold. The 
one’s who were bombing were ISIS. Actually, I think we Syrians, handle it 
way better than the Turks, since we already know the situation, we already 
know how to handle mortal shells and what to do when something is falling 
from the sky. So, it didn’t make much difference, we already know how to 
deal with it. We are kinda emotionally, I can’t say dead, but numb. (2) 
 
 The Syrian I interviewed retells the dangerous situation which occurred in Kilis 
during a 2-week period on April 2016 when mortal shells were shot from Syria into 
Turkish territory by ISIS militia. Although the Turkish military interfered, protests 
unfolded within the same month in response to the mortar shells dropped in Kilis by 
ISIS. The protest also blamed Syrian refugees for rising conflict in the region, but 
Turkish media did not cover these accusations. A video recording was circulated and 
shared by the interviewee’s Syrian friends as described below: 
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There were some protests by Turkish citizens against Syrians, since the 
bombs are coming from Syria, so that was also a shock. They were 
protesting Syrians who are living in Kilis. They’re blaming the wrong 
people. It’s not justice, but we (Syrians) forgot justice for a long time. (2) 
 
The above excerpt highlights Syrian refugees’ awareness of the injustices taking 
place against them by the Turkish public but they are not compelled to protest them. 
Such grievances are yet another important theme for Syrians living in Turkey and they 
resonate across other concerns as described below: 
Two months ago (January), people here standed (stood) in the street, they 
want homes, they want food, because they want new laws in Turkey but I 
don’t think something real happened. (4) 
 
Across Turkey, Syrians share grievances that are congruent with juxtaposing 
their experiences alongside negative terms. The radicalization literature would suggest 
that individuals can become attracted and ultimately support radical ideologies based on 
shared grievances among the Syrian refugee community. It is through the use of these 
broad narratives depicting grievances, such as that of a lack of educational 
opportunities, that the Syrian refugee community in Turkey could begin to share 
common attitudes regarding local issues and by which radical groups like Britain’s al-
Muhajiroun (Wikotowicz 2011, p. 18) were able to easily recruit members. In this case, 
he success of recruitment was initiated through awareness programs that al-Muhajiroun 
used to appeal to its target community by illustrating the narrative of the “plight of 
Muslims rather than its particular solutions” (Wikotowicz 2011, p. 18).  
With the policies of the EU and Turkey halting the flow of Syrians into the EU, 
the lack of opportunities in employment and education, and the lack of assimilation of 
Syrians in Turkey have to choose between a life of misery or death: 
 
It’s really bad because most of them you can see them riding the boats to 
escape from Turkey to, to any other country where they can see at least see 
a future, some stability for one or two years, at least. People come here if 
they have money and they will continue to Europe or any other country they 
can find, if they don’t have money, they will work until they get some money, 
and go to, to some other country. And as, the longer it takes, the more 
people will lose hope and they will start going outside. So, if, you’ve seen 
the summer, the big refugee crisis, next summer will be more horrible if 
nothing is done. (1) 
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Crossing the border into Turkey as IDPs to refugees entailed its own traumas 
and grievances that Syrians share in Turkey. When recounting her experience crossing 
the border into Turkey, Fatima al-Ahmed recalls the Turkish refugee smugglers as 
“mean, violent, and only think(ing) about money. They push us like beasts, hitting the 
women who don’t walk fast enough, even when they are carrying babies. It’s terrible, 
it’s the law of the jungle” (Moutot 2016). Aside from the emotional distress of crossing 
a border, Syrians endure an economical blow during this phase, many using their last 
savings to pay the estimated price of $1,000 to be smuggled into Turkey (Moutot 2016). 
The incidents that have occurred in Turkey between refugees and the Turkish 
community both personally and collectively adds to how individuals conceptualize their 
experiences as a whole. Series of cases involving violent confrontations between Turks 
and Syrian refugees as mentioned in previous sections have developed negative 
sentiments. These traumatic experiences endured by Syrians continue in Turkey today, 
creating grievances for incidents that should not be occurring.  
In Antakya, Syrian teenagers aged between 16 and 18 attempted to steal bread 
from a shop but were immediately apprehended by the two Turkish shopkeepers who 
resorted to violently attacking and removing the two individuals (Hürriyet Daily News 
2016f). In Izmir, a Syrian refugee toddler was violently slammed to the ground by a 
street vendor (Hürriyet Daily News, 2016e). In the Turkish city of Urfa, two Syrians 
were beheaded by ISIS sympathizers for their support of a Raqqa-based human rights 
group (Dearden 2015).  
In Konya, a knife fight between one Turkish man and four Syrians broke out 
over a confrontation on animal cruelty and escalated quickly resulting in the death of 
the Turkish man and one of the Syrians (Hürriyet Daily News 2016j). To protest the 
incident, family members and friends of the deceased Turkish man stationed themselves 
in front of the hospital to attack the other injured Syrians. As a result, police officers 
were called in to intervene at the scene and had to use tear gas to break down the 
confrontation. Despite these efforts, the relatives of the deceased Turkish man remained 
outside the compounds of the hospital until the following morning to continue their 
protest against the Syrian refugees. 
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The Syrians interviewed reflected on their experiences in Turkey within a shared 
meaning that took on their personal experiences and those shared by other refugees. 
Both at the individual level and from secondary sources, refugees in Turkey are sharing 
the perception that they are cumulatively undergoing unprecedented grievances that 
require reevaluation at the governmental level.  
The living conditions in Turkey alone have become a sort of trauma to many 
Syrians especially those whom consider themselves more conservative and reflect on 
the cultural shocks they’ve experienced. An excerpt from an interview discussing these 
conditions is quoted below: 
 
It’s really bad for them, those people are working at really underpaid jobs, 
difficult situation. A family of ten people living in a single house with three 
of them working and the rest of them are just living on the very few money 
that the other three are bringing, so they’re mostly living in bad situations, 
not really that good life. (1) 
 
Zambrana (2016) draws attention to the issue of gender in Turkey as it has created 
traumatic experiences for Syrian women. She states that “gender is an important factor 
to consider when understanding how Syrians experience their life in Turkey. Women, in 
particular, are exposed to different traumas than men, mostly in the likes of harassment 
or discrimination in public spaces. In addition, to curtail financial burdens and to assist 
family, marriages between Syrian women and Turkish men have exponentially grown in 
Turkey”. 
As an option to curtail the “temporary protection beneficiary” status and gain 
citizenship in Turkey, many Syrian refugee women began marrying Turkish men. In the 
Turkish law, Article 16 outlines “aliens who have been married to a Turkish citizen for 
at least three years and whose marriage still continues can apply for the acquisition of 
Turkish citizenship” (Çağaptay 2014). As of the start of the Syrian conflict, Syrian 
women’s marriages to Turkish men has exponential growth with 573 marriages in 2011, 
841 marriages in 2012, and 753 marriages in 2013” (Çağaptay 2014). 
Aside from the marriage issue, Syrian women are subjected to sexual 
harassment in a relatively less conservative country than their hometown of Syria. Their 
inability to communicate in the same language and lack of knowledge of cultural norms 
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between men and women make them vulnerable to harassment. These experiences are 
reiterated below: 
 
When I was going to the hospital to check on the baby, on Haider, when I 
was pregnant, the nurses were really really rude. They treat us very bad. 
It’s a hospital, I want to say hello, it’s humanitarian, it’s humanity, but 
where is it? There is a Syrian woman, I think she was having her labor, she 
just cannot go up, she can’t stand up, they were scream at her, blaspheme 
her, I don’t know they treat us really really bad in Urfa, when they talk to 
me, they talk in an aggressive way, I don’t understand their language, but I 
know they were swearing on us. (4) 
 
I never go from home, I’m always home, but my husband goes to his work 
and I just go on the internet, taking care of my baby. Just this, is the only 
thing I can do. Because when I go to the streets, in Urfa the men (Turkish) 
to us, I feel like, sometimes they were chasing us. My sister in-law and I 
were shopping and two Turkish men were moving, follow us, we were afraid 
that time, we don’t know the country, we don’t know how we should treat 
with them, and its embarrassing to talk to them in this way, we just go to 
home as quick as possible. They were bothering us so much. They start to 
want to talk to us, you know it’s like, flirting, but it’s too hard to know what 
they really want. Sometimes when I saw them talk to us, they don’t speak to 
any Turkish women. I know it’s not their regular habits and in Syria, it’s not 
regular to talk to strangers, especially men strangers. (4) 
 
The above excerpt belongs to a woman I interviewed as she reveals the cultural 
shock as a refugee. The increasing hostility between the Turkish and Syrian refugee 
society has led Syrian refugees to experience traumas that developed resentments and 
grievances against the Turkish society. Although Syrians are exposed to serious 
conflicts with the Turkish society, it is not enough to say that these sentiments alone can 
result in radicalization. Instead, there are other crucial factors playing into the case of 
Syrian refugees living in Turkey that reject the claims made by radicalization theories 
on radicalization. These will be discussed in further detail in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4:  ASSIMILATION, INTEGRATION, AND BELONGING 
 
 
 
 
4.1 The Role of the Media 
 
 
 
The admission of refugees by host countries has always been a controversial 
topic discussed by the hosting public. Mostly, it is a contested subject involving heated 
debate between those arguing for global human responsibility and those for the 
protection of national values. The Syrian refugee crisis is currently at the forefront of 
this political debate in not only Turkey, but internationally. Drawing international 
attention, in November, G20 leaders from around the world met in Antalya to discuss 
the refugee crisis (Al Jazeera 2015). It also played a critical role in dividing 
communities between opinions and affecting voter turnouts within the United States’ 
presidential elections as in Donald Trump’s campaign (Watson 2016) and Britain’s 
Brexit (Siegfried 2016).  
 
 
 
4.1 (a) Domestic and International Media 
 
 
At the top of the agenda in media coverage has been the heavy criticisms across 
the international arena on the relationship between Turkey and the European Union 
(EU) in relation to the Syrian refugee crisis. The role of the refugee crisis in facilitating 
Turkey’s accession into the EU is primarily focused on curtailing the flow of refugees 
into Turkey and taking back undocumented Syrians who enter EU territory (Hürriyet 
Daily News 2016h). In response to the backlash from the international community, the 
EU stated “we must work with Turkey to ensure refugees are properly sheltered, we 
must do so on its own merits and not mix it with accession” (Hürriyet Daily News 
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2016h). In an interview with a Syrian refugee, the individual interprets the EU-Turkey 
Syrian refugee deal: 
 
I’m tired of watching the news. I’ve been watching for five years and all I 
can see in the news is that everyone is playing a dangerous game that the 
only victim is the Syrian people. So it’s blood-sucking. So they, the Turkish 
government, is pushing the EU, the EU doesn’t want refugees. They (EU) 
fear for themselves for bombing. So they just, so the Turkish government 
just takes the money without wanting them, it’s a win-win situation. (2) 
 
 
Another major issue concerning the international media is that of refugees in 
relation to Islamophobia. Media framing plays a critical role in forming anti-Islamic 
sentiments and has led to discriminatory perceptions in the minds of targeted audiences 
across the globe (Sian et al 2012). As Syrians experience the effects of otherization in 
media, feelings of stigmatization develop, promoting resentment and the narrative of 
“us against them”. The extent from which perceived injustices reverberate in junction to 
the media’s and internet’s role at the international level is a growing theme in 
contemporary radicalization studies (Ranstorp 2010).  
Although the non-Muslim Western host country versus the Muslim refugee 
Islamophobia narrative has been an all too familiar theme, how this phenomenon plays 
within the Muslim westernized host country versus the Muslim refugee is new to the 
international agenda and has not received as much attention. Among this discourse is 
that of Ayhan Kaya and Ayse Tecmen (2011) who argue that Islamophobia is not 
limited to the European context, it is also active within Turkish perceptions.  
Therefore, the role of the media in forming attitudes among Syrian refugees 
ushers in an important perspective as it contributes to how the Turkish and the 
international communities view the crisis. Citing economic expenditures, communal 
interactions, and differences in religious conservatism, Sharma (2015) states that an 86 
percent of Turks oppose the free flow of Syrian refugees into Turkey.  
Violent radical behavior has seen a spike in coverage by Turkish media 
especially of its own citizens like the story of Süleyman Bengi’s recruitment as a 
foreign fighter in Syria. Tagging along his twin brothers, Bengi’s recruitment into ISIS 
perplexed the Turkish community as his family, educational background, and 
respectable economic standing did not seem to align with classical themes on 
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radicalization (Kizilkoyun 2015). Partly, Turkish media has blamed Islamist bookstores 
(Kizilkoyun 2015) as well as the flow of Syrian refugees into the region for the rise in 
tensions. 
As a result, Turkish society is molding their perceptions of refugees through 
media coverage, as little dialogue is available between the Syrian refugee and Turkish 
communities. At the other end, the lack of integration of Syrians into the Turkish 
community has redirected Syrians towards establishing and maintaining social networks 
through online platforms. The issues that arise with the use of online resources as a tool 
for social interaction is the easiness by which radical attitudes can make their way into 
the minds of Syrian refugees. 
 
 
 
4.1 (b) The Internet and Social Media 
 
 
 
The individuals I interviewed pointed towards their reliance on social media 
as a hub for socialization with other Syrians and other individuals since 
interaction with the Turkish community is limited. For free time, Syrian refugees 
are roaming the internet to counter the absence of social interaction in Turkey, 
allowing them to escape the social stigma that comes with the tile of “refugee”. 
Below is a short excerpt explaining the reliance of online social networks: 
 
I think now, I’m just in the internet, all my life is coming to be in a virtual 
reality, my friends are just in the internet. (4) 
 
 
As an alternative to their reality and to engage with other Syrians in Turkey that 
share common experiences in their host country, Syrians are connecting to other Syrians 
communities online. In this stage, radicalization theorists like Ranstorp (2010) would 
argue that social isolation and dedication to online communities “are an important 
gateway into extremist circles” (p. 15). Bermingham et al. (2009) also add to the theme 
of online radicalization, claiming that these gateways are integral for the development 
of radical ideologies because “internet users with no apparent prior links to jihadism 
may have the potential to be drawn into radical circles via their interactions on a popular 
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global site” (p. 232). 
For radical groups seeking vulnerable members of often isolated communities, 
online networks become a “valuable instrument for strengthening their most important 
activities” (Soriano 2012, p. 274). Once individuals determine that there are other cases 
similar to their stories, it produces feelings of comfort and trust. Wiktorowicz argues 
that preceding the phase of establishing interest in radical actions, radical ideologies 
grow within an individual when trust is attained through credibility and thus facilitates 
frame alignment (Wiktorowicz 2004, p. 20). 
The Turkish case of Süleyman Bengi as discussed above also places importance 
on the influence of online communities in the process of radical ideologies.  In fact, it 
was through the use of social media platforms that Bengi maintained close contact with 
his twin brothers, Diler and Dilşat, who attended different high schools in Diyarbakır. 
Thus, through this medium it is “likely that Süleyman radicalized his brothers through 
their social media correspondence and persuaded them to go to Syria” to join ISIS 
(Gürcan 2015).  
In another platform, the Turkish public has also taken to social media to express 
their feelings on the Syrian refugee crisis in their country. In the most recent case, Turks 
hit Twitter to fire back at President Erdoğan’s proposal to make Syrian refugees Turkish 
citizens (Tharoor 2016) by hashtagging #UlkemdeSuriyeliIstemiyorum which translates 
to “I don’t want Syrians in my country” (Girit 2016). 
Although the media has commended Turkey for its role in admitting the largest 
number of Syrian refugees and for its collaboration with international non-governmental 
organizations (INGOs) in “assisting the hundreds of thousands of refugees eking out an 
existence in urban centers” (Kirişci and Ferris 2015), refugees do not agree with the 
latter. Instead, they not only are experiencing a lack of integration and assistance both 
by the Turkish government and INGOs in assimilating into its cities but are exposed to 
discrimination and social isolation by the Turkish public. 
The outlet to cyberspace that Syrians are opting for to engage in social 
interaction as a result of the societal exclusion they’re experiencing in Turkey is a 
critical finding that deserves further research outside the scope of this thesis. Most 
importantly, despite the narrative proposed by theorists such as Ranstorp (2010), 
Bermingham et al. (2009), and Soriano (2012) that mark vulnerable and isolated 
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communities like Syrian refugees in Turkey prone to become radicalized through 
interaction on online networks, Syrian refugees are not indicative of radicalization. 
Instead, Syrian refugees contradict the notion prescribed to them by the literature as 
“victims to the radical message” (Sieckelinck et al 2015) because they take initiative to 
engage with NGO communities in Turkey that are composed of Turkish and foreign 
individuals. 
The following section moves away from the virtual dimension of online 
interactions and instead focuses on the role of radicalization by the ways in which 
Syrian refugees perceive their assimilation, integration, and sense of belonging in 
Turkey. 
 
 
 
4.2 Social Implications 
 
 
 
The unprecedented increase of Syrian refugees entering Turkey has brought 
about negative sentiments in the Turkish public who express concern regarding the 
“high numbers in cities, the increasing length of their stay in Turkey, their perceived 
contribution to rising housing costs and increased unemployment, and their economic 
competition with Turkish citizens” (İçduygu 2015, p.1).  Ahmet İçduygu (2015) claims 
that the Turkish government underestimated the Syrian crisis’ length and “ignored the 
possibility of long-term or permanent stay and instead focused on providing aid and 
assistance to refugees in camps” (p.7). In 2013, nearly all refugees were situated in 
refugee camps; however, a year later, at the end of 2014, four out of five Syrian 
refugees in Turkey lived outside of refugee camps (İçduygu 2015). 
A Syrian refugee interviewed for this thesis, aware of the Turkish public’s and 
government’s change in reception with the population increase, expressed this shift by 
stating: 
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In the beginning, Turkish people were so compassionate with Syrians, they 
provided a lot. We were okay in the beginning, we really had really positive 
reception from the Turkish people but as, as numbers increased and the 
situation became first, crime rate increased and also the people became 
more desperate and they-- they uh, some Turkish people starting taking 
advantage of them (Syrian refugees). (1) 
 
  Below are excerpts highlighting just some of the feelings Syrians expressed 
within the social, employment, and linguistic context that express isolation from the 
Turkish public: 
 
I don’t really know much of the Turkish point of view, as I said, Syrians are 
mostly living in their own societies and I haven’t been in contact with 
Turkish people. (1) 
 
Some people have been here for months and still the same. Just as if they 
arrived, not having a job, not knowing anything, staying closed to 
themselves. (2) 
 
I don’t speak the language, I don’t want to learn Turkish, my license doesn’t 
work for being an architect. Physical hurt isn’t an issue; I don’t belong here 
(Turkey). We will never be part of the society, we are what we are, we can’t 
change, it’s not possible. This keeps popping into my head: “East, West, 
home is the best”. Nothing replaces home. I don’t think I can melt (into 
society) anywhere. (3) 
 
It’s like, not just sadness, it’s more than sadness, I could say it’s like a 
weakness, it’s not my home, not my people, no family, no friends here. I 
don’t know the language, they don’t speak English, it’s too hard. (4) 
 
The isolation that Syrian refugees express would under contemporary 
radicalization theories constitute as the preliminary indicators for the formation of 
radicalization. As Jaffer (2013) argues, a “member of a minority who has low-self 
esteem and feels excluded may use terrorism to affirm his or her ethnic or religious 
identity.” Robert E. Park and Wernest W. Burgess defined assimilation as a “process of 
interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, 
sentiments and attitudes of other persons or groups, and by sharing their experience and 
history are incorporated with them in a common cultural life” (Quoted in Hirsch 1943, 
p. 35).  
In the United States, a research on refugees found that at the first stages of 
entering the host country, individuals begin to “exhibit symptoms of mental health 
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problems” as they attempt to assimilate. De Bie et al (2014) depict the frustrating 
circumstances that asylum seekers must undergo when adjusting to new social spaces: 
 
“Asylum seekers share relatively small and sober living spaces with several 
people. Privacy in ACs (Apartment Complexes) is limited and social 
conflicts occur on a regular basis. Asylum seekers are supposed to organise 
their own leisure activities, but have difficulties integrating into society due 
to their lack of contacts and language skill” (p. 285) 
 
Nevertheless, Turkey provides Syrians refugees with an environment that is not 
only cultural and architectural reminiscent to home, but it provides personal security. 
An interviewee explains his experience in Turkey as a Sunni Muslim versus that of a 
Sunni Muslim in Western societies: 
I don’t feel like a stranger here (Turkey). Most importantly, we (Syrian 
refugees) are not treated as terrorists here. With Charlie Hebdo, the whole 
continent (Europe) got scared, we didn’t here. I don’t have to be scared 
here for that. (3) 
 
Comparatively, “refugees who are working and self-sufficient have fewer 
adjustment problems than those who remain at home or accept public assistance for 
extended periods” (Finnan1981, p. 292). Below is an excerpt of a Syrian refugee I 
interviewed, addressing his reflection on attaining a new job and the sorts of effects it 
entailed: 
 
Since I started working, everything became easier, because I became more 
involved in the society. Even having more money affected that. I have a 
residence permit, which qualifies me to apply for a job. My organization is 
currently submitted my work permit papers and I’m still waiting for it. (2) 
 
The current literature claims that a lack of personal social and economic 
development in a community are important triggers and serve as driving forces for the 
use of violent extremism.  However, Syrian refugee’s responses express otherwise. In 
the following subsections, the role of assimilation, integration, and belonging are 
delineated to describe how Syrians make sense of their status in Turkey, employment 
opportunities, as well educational opportunities and how their experiences break the 
contemporary arguments for their radicalization. 
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4.2 (a) Status of Syrians 
 
 
On July 29 2009, continued internal hostilities in Syria resulted in the first 
migration of Syrian refugees into Turkey (General Directorate of Migration 2015). On 
July 2011, Turkey roughly 15,000 Syrian refugees arrived in southeastern Turkey’s 
Antakya (İçduygu 2015). As the first wave of refugees arriving to Turkey outside the 
geographical scope of Europe, Syrians were not granted legal asylum as decreed by the 
1952 Refugee Convention (Çağaptay 2014). Although a refugee is defined by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as “people fleeing conflict or 
persecution” and “they are defined and protected in international law, and must not be 
expelled or retuned to situations where their life and freedom are at risk” (UNHCR 
2016), Syrians in Turkey were only admitted under a “temporary refugee status” on 
November 2011 (Çağaptay 2014). In 2011, with the assistance of UNHCR, Turkey 
granted Syrians with a “guest” status. Two years later, on April 2013, Ankara 
established the Turkish Law on Foreigners and International Protection to steer the 
growing refugee flow which was then implemented on April 2014 (Çağaptay 2014). 
Within the framework of Article 91 of Law No 6458 on Foreigners and 
International Protection, Syrian’s Temporary Protection serves “foreigners who have 
been forced to leave their country, cannot return to the country that they have left, and 
have arrived at or crossed the borders of Turkey in a mass influx situation seeking 
immediate and temporary protection” (General Directorate of Migration 2015). The 
plight of Syrian refugees into Turkey is considered by the UNHCR as a mass influx 
because it constitutes as “significant numbers of arrivals over a short period of time of 
person from the same country or geographical region, and for whom, due to their 
numbers, individual refugee status determination is procedurally impractical” (UNHCR 
FAQ 2015). 
The benefits entitled to Syrians under the Temporary Protection plan begin once 
registration is completed and includes identification cards which “facilitate access to 
medical assistance and other assistance provided through the sub-governorates” 
(UNHCR FAQ 2015, p. 3). The title prescribed to Syrians by the Law on Foreigners 
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and International Protection as “temporary protection beneficiaries in 2014,” (Ineli-
Ciger 2014, p. 28) enables Syrians living outside camps to receive some government-
based aid such as free medical services at health centers or hospitals (UNHCR FAQ 
2015, p.3). The policy for Syrians in Turkey led by Erdoğan’s government is guaranteed 
through an open-door policy, non-refoulement, and a formal registration (Özden 2013, 
p.5). 
In the excerpt below, an interviewee explains the identification that Syrians are 
given and the benefits it includes. Although Syrians are given these identification cards 
to register them and distribute benefits, the government’s lack of clarity and guidance in 
even translating them highlights fault lines at the beginning stages of the transition in 
Turkey: 
 
They (Syrians) have this ID card, that the government gives them, the 
Syrians call it ‘kimlik’. I think it means ID in Turkish, but because Syrians 
doesn’t know what it means they call it ‘kimlik’, I think the official name is 
the ‘Identification Card of the Syrian Guests,’ something like that. So this 
card, because a lot of people don’t have ID cards, so this card lets them go 
to hospitals, put children in schools, discounts on medicines but that’s it. (1) 
 
 
 As the legal status in Turkey for Syrians remains in limbo, the asylum seekers 
struggle to accept the title granted by Ankara. Below are excerpts that reflect the 
concerns of a “temporary protection beneficiary status”: 
 
I think there is no specific policy actually. Practically, they benefit from 
medicine, of course. In terms of their rights, what they can do, what they 
can’t, it’s constantly changing. Of course, it’s always changing for the 
worse. If they (Syrians) were registered as refugees, they (Turkish 
government) would have to give them more rights, more money. They want 
to control them of course; they want to keep them in check. And of course, 
there is the opposition in Turkey, which is trying to push back the Syrians, 
so they have also voice, so they can affect the decision. Of course, the 
Turkish government doesn’t want to lose its people. So they don’t want to 
give the Syrians more rights because that would upset a good percentage of 
the Turkish citizens. (2) 
 
We are considered “refugees” that words mean something, we are not 
visitors here, we came forcefully, we are trying to adapt to the new 
situation. (2) 
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Former Foreign Minister of Turkey, Ahmet Davutoğlu, extended his support of 
this open door policy to Syrians by stating those “who are not happy at home” can go to 
Turkey (Özden 2013, p. 1). However, the limitations that come along with the 
implementation of a “temporary protection regime” (Özden 2013, p. 5) for Syrians have 
been delineated by the current Turkish Deputy Prime Minister, Numan Kurtulmuş, as he 
referred to the integration processes of Syrians into the Turkish community by stating 
“let me say this very openly; deeming the Syrian refugees [as the] local population is 
out of question,” and “as for the issue of [defining refugees as] ‘local citizen,’ that is 
entirely speculation” (Hürriyet Daily News 2016g). 
A common theme I observed across the Syrians I interviewed was that the 
individuals were up-to-speed and well-informed of the shifting political policies that 
Turkey applies to them. This is in part due to the constant changes of the legal benefits 
to Syrians and their involvement in civil activism in Syria. Below is an analysis of the 
open-door policy by one of the interviewees: 
 
The government here is just, I think they are doing, what they are doing is 
keeping Turkey as a stopping point, they don’t want Syrians to stay here, so 
they are welcoming Syrians, at least before, but since January 2015 they 
close the borders and its really becoming crazy to go in and out. So, you 
can, a Syrian can come to Turkey and they can stay here, but they can’t do 
anything. They’re really at a stopping point because if there are at least, if a 
Syrian stays here for awhile, if I want to go outside of Turkey, if I don’t have 
a residence permit, it will be really complicated. If I don’t have valid 
passport, its almost impossible. And who can do that if they don’t have 
money and they are wanted by the regime? They can’t have passports and 
they can’t have residence permits. (1) 
 
Although Western audiences and entities like the United Nations and the 
European Union have welcomed Turkey’s refugee work permits as “seeds of success,” 
(Grisgraber and Hollingworth 2016) it is important to note that as Syrian refugees 
allocate more benefits than currently provided as “temporary protection beneficiary” 
status in Turkey, their courage to have a voice within the workforce also increases. It is 
clear that Syrians are aware of their limitations given their status; however, objections 
to the treatments and policies affecting their livelihood in the form of protests is rooted 
across European and American civilizations within the narrative of the working class 
struggle and does not necessarily result in radicalization.  
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Despite the fact that Turkey’s open-door policy has been commended at the 
international level, loopholes have created a filtering system for Syrians entering the 
host country, contradicting the image of Turkish hospitality. For most of the Syrians 
who have gone through physically and emotionally exhausting journeys to reach the 
border of Turkey, the next stage they need to undergo entails satisfying a requirement 
that not every refugee meets: a valid passport (Özden 2013). As for the individuals who 
do not hold a valid passport and are seeking refuge in Turkey, entering the host country 
takes the form of illegal passages that are often life risking. Therefore, the temporary 
protection policy, which entails non-refoulement, turns a blind eye to refugees that 
reach the border of Turkey without a valid passport. Since November 2015, Syrian 
refugees and NGOs like Human Rights Watch report that the border to enter Turkey has 
been closed (Bora 2015) although Turkey continues to be commended for its open-
border policy. A Syrian refugee I interviewed explained that although Turkey claims to 
have an open-door policy, the international border between Turkey and Syria, Bab al-
Hawa, has remained closed for months: 
There’s no legal way to get into Turkey by land, uh, the door that is called 
Bab al-Hawa only gets, uh, the emergency cases to get through it’s door. No 
regular Syrians can go there and get into Turkey legally. I tried. I asked. I 
ask every month actually, if there’s any change, there’s no change so far. 
There’s also--I’m following their Facebook page for updates--I keep asking 
the same questions, the answer is always no. (3) 
 
Among the individuals interviewed, a vivid illustration of the grueling 
experiences that contradict the image purported of an open-door policy. The excerpt 
involves several attempts at crossing both legally and illegally into Turkey for the 
purpose of attending a workshop that added value to rebuilding efforts in Syria: 
 
We travelled illegally the first time. It was quite humiliating. The first time it 
took us three days from Al Qamishli, you know Al Qamishli is on the border 
with Turkey but it’s closed because you know Turks don’t like Kurds and 
that Al Qamishli is full of Kurds, so it’s kinda closed there. So we tried Tell 
Abyad, it’s north of Al Raqqah, we tried to go there and it was my late 
friend, Osama, and his pregnant wife, Marwa. It was really hard going with 
a pregnant woman. We went to Tell Abyad we tried there illegally, and it 
didn’t work out. We found a smuggler and he wanted to take $100 each to 
get us across, so we said what the hell, let’s go for it. When we tried, the 
Turkish troops on the border caught us, and while we were running, she fell. 
So, I can’t tell you how that felt seeing a pregnant woman fall, it was like 6-
7 months (of pregnancy). So you know after all it worked out (they reached 
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the border), but they didn’t let us in, so you know, we came back to Al 
Raqqah. Tried legally, it didn’t work out. So we went illegally, I was 
running across the border carrying a bag this big for about 200-300 meters 
running across the border. At that time, we just didn’t think about the 
workshop, being in that stressful environment, you need to loose some 
steam, coming here (Turkey) and seeing civilization again. So it was 
refreshing and worth it. We got across finally but covered in mud, we had to 
cross a stream which was about three meters wide and the height was I 
think, one meter, I think. We had to cross it with all these bags, we jumped 
but first we got some water, so after we crossed the border, we stayed 6 
hours until we got to the hotel, and all those 6 hours we were soaked. (2) 
 
  Other cases have appeared by which “Turkey has started implementing visa 
restrictions for Syrians entering the country by air or by sea as part of its efforts to stem 
the flow of migrants into Europe” (Hürriyet Daily News 2016a). However, it should be 
noted that visa restrictions won’t apply to Syrian refugees who cross the Syrian-Turkish 
border by land to flee the conflict in Syria. Nevertheless, this means that Syrians must 
go through dangerous routes by land, often dealing with radical groups like ISIS or 
Jabhat al-Nusra, to reach Turkey. The overall goal of the new visa restriction is to 
curtail “Syrians from flying into Turkey from other countries and illegally trying to 
reach Greece and other European nations” (Hürriyet Daily News 2016a). 
Amnesty International is among the NGOs who have been critical of Turkey’s 
treatment of Syrian refugees. The NGO claimed that “Turkish authorities have been 
rounding up ‘potentially hundreds of people’ onto buses in western Turkey and moving 
them to isolated detention centers in the east, where they are often subjected to abuse” 
and thus making it a breach on the non-refoulement policy which prohibits the force 
return of refugees as indicated in international law (Hürriyet Daily News 2015b). With 
international attention on human rights abuses, Turkey has become vigilant of NGOs 
like Human Rights Watch that are interested in conducting investigations on the 
Kurdish conflict in southeast Turkey but have been blocked access to the area (Hürriyet 
Daily News, 2016k). 
The most unsettling feeling for Syrians residing in Turkey is the unpredictability 
of tomorrow, as policies towards their livelihood are constantly changing in terms of 
laws, international agreements, status, educational and work opportunities, and human 
rights.  How policy makers determine to enact or reject decisions on Syrians living in 
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Turkey directly determines the living standards of millions of Syrian refugees who are 
currently at the hands of the Turkish government and EU members.  
Irrespective to the fact that Erdoğan’s government has admitted nearly 3 million 
Syrian refugees into the country in line with the 1951 Convention of the Status of 
Refugees, the asylum policy does not recognize Syrians as “refugees”; instead, they are 
referred to as “temporary protection beneficiaries” because the crisis they experienced 
in their home country is not within Europe’s geographical framework (Özden 2013, p. 
5) The role of human dignity is not integral within the Turkish domestic policy on 
Syrian refugees as Article 22 on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which 
states that “Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is 
entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in 
accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social 
and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his 
personality” (Universal Declaration of Human Rights 2016). Instead, Syrians are not 
being integrated into Turkish society and are left with a sense of alienation from the 
working class in Turkey as described by one of the interviewees and will be further 
discussed in the following subchapter: 
 
So, mostly, I think now, Syrian people, uh, are not being integrated into 
Turkish community, they are still isolated, they are living on their own 
groups, their own societies, inside Turkey, and the Turkish people are not 
really feeling good about the Syrians being here in Turkey with this large 
number, especially at least on the south part of Turkey. The first thing I say 
(to Syrians), if you can find a job, you can come, if you can’t find a job, it 
will be really difficult for you. And if you have some money don’t waste it in 
Turkey, ride the boat, spend what you have and then you will start looking 
for money to ride the boat. Because they will not achieve anything in Turkey 
unless someone has a scholarship to study or working with an organization 
and that means really qualifications, because the competition is really high 
because so many Syrians are here and trying to work. It’s very difficult, to, 
to do. (1) 
  
 
 
4.2 (b) Employment 
 
 
Magnus Hornqvist and Janne Flyghed emphasize the importance of employment 
as a domino effect towards the positive assimilation of individuals by stating that “being 
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integrated is first and foremost equated with having a job” (Hornqvist and Flyghed 
2012, p. 328). Nevertheless, with work competition being a major issue within the 
Turkish community alone, the mass influx of Syrians into the work force has added fire 
to the fuel on the workforce debate. As Syrians are desperate for a means of income to 
survive in Turkey, any work opportunity whether through illegal, underpaid, 
overworked, or in dangerous circumstances has become mutually beneficial to both 
Syrians and employers. However, considering these conditions, local Turkish workers 
argue that they are being pushed at the bottom of the work chain (Özden 2013). 
Çağaptay (2014) explains the conflict in Turkey’s job market with the rise of 
Syrian refugee workers entering the illegal sector: 
 “The Turkish job market is strained especially by illegal Syrian immigrants 
who are unregistered as refugees. Such arrivals typically use their existing 
savings to rent small apartments, and they seek informal work opportunities 
in textile factories, clothing stores, restaurants, and construction and 
agriculture sites. If these Syrians are caught by the police, they are sent to 
refugee camps. As illegal work- ers, they earn below the minimum wage, 
reportedly around $250– 300 monthly, which is just enough to cover their 
living expenses. Some salvage a bit extra to send back to their families in 
Syria.” 
Only 3 percent of the total population of Syrian refugees in Turkey are qualified 
for employment in the labor market when considering their educational backgrounds 
(Hürriyet Daily News 2016c). In turn, this had led to the rise of underage Syrians 
working illegally in Turkey (Johannisson 2016) to help support their families with the 
economic burden of refugee life while even having to make uniforms for ISIS, al 
Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, and Free Syrian Army fighters (Hunter and 
Rizk 2016). On the 30th of January in 2013 a factory fire killed eight people in 
Gaziantep, two of which were Syrians. Although Turkish media did confirm that two of 
the deceased men were undocumented refugees, they did not confirm their Syrian 
nationality (Hürriyet Daily News 2013). 
 
“I don’t want to live here (Turkey). They don’t allow us to work in the local 
(market)” (4) 
 
A Syrian reflected on his recent employment as both “happy and sad” because 
being hired entailed a sense of guilt when he compared his luck to other refugees. The 
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passage below illustrates how rent prices to salary income in Gaziantep is a struggle for 
most Syrian refugees:  
 
As a single man, $1,000 is more than enough to live, as a single man of 
course. I can take a 1+1 with 900 TL which also makes like $300. But as for 
other refugees, I am considered like the 1% which has a good life now, the 
other 99% so expensive for them. Seriously, the average worker is getting 
like 1,000 TL, 1,500 maximum, so it’s (rent) quite high for them, what if he 
has a wife and three children? That 1+1 is not enough for them. Most of 
them (Syrians) work illegally, only few, let’s say, I don’t want to make it so 
low, so 5% of the Syrian people work legally. (2) 
 
Many Syrians are not only juggling the finances of sustaining a life in Turkey, 
but they are also desperate to make an income to help their family in Syria as described 
by an interviewee: “I also care for my family and I want to bring them here and now I 
can. With this income, I can” (1).  
Nevertheless, the common theme across Syrian refugees is that even those who 
are lucky enough to enter the workforce, will eventually do so illegally. An interviewee 
describes the situation that other Syrian refugees may face if they are considering to 
take refuge in Turkey: 
 
People come here if they have money and they will continue to Europe or 
any other country they can find, if they don’t have money, they will work 
until they get some money, and go to, to some other country. And as, the 
longer it takes, the more people will lose hope and they will start going 
outside. So, if, you’ve seen the summer, the big refugee crisis, next summer 
will be more horrible if nothing is done. And as I said, most of them are 
working just to get enough money for the smuggler to put them in a boat. 
that’s I think that’s more than 85% of the Syrians’ ambition here. Just to get 
enough money to ride that boat, and either drown, or make it. if you are 
living in a country where you don’t have money, you don’t have future, you 
don’t have anything, you have children that are starving. There isn’t much 
you can do. (1) 
 
Even with the new issuing of work permits for Syrians, it remains a slow and 
selective process from which very few have gotten access to work permits and those 
denied any sort of legal work, let alone in their field, are left to “begging on the streets, 
performing illegal, underpaid, and at times dangerous jobs” (Grisgraber and 
Hollingsworth 2016). Thus, refugees in Turkey are left incapable of sustaining a 
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standard of life that is in line with international standards. An interview with a refugee 
illustrated this struggle: 
 
Staying here (Turkey) will get them nowhere. A Syrian that would stay here, 
if they want to stay officially, they will have to get a work permission and 
they will have to pay a lot of money and find their own companies. I know a 
lot of some people who did that, they make companies and start working in 
it and they have Turkish people and have Syrian people. That takes money, 
that takes knowledge, that takes a lot of effort. And some people are just 
lucky and are working with Turkish people, working in factories, they are 
working. Some engineers I know, I know a guy who works in accounting, 
he’s an accountant for a very good company here in Istanbul. Some people 
are lucky, but the percentage is really small and it takes a lot of effort and 
qualifications to get somewhere. (1) 
 
Employment and education are intrinsic to countering the development of 
radical ideologies in migrant populations. The meager legal opportunities in the 
employment sector available to Syrian refugees debilitates their opportunities for self-
development in Turkey although “employment is one of the most important pillars of 
integration (because) in the workplace, refugees can improve their language, tap into the 
culture while becoming financially independent.” (Meaker, 2016) 
 
 
 
4.2 (c) Educational Opportunities 
 
 
Although Turkey’s Temporary Protection law claims that “all children in 
Turkey, including foreigners, have the right to receive primary and secondary school 
education free of charge (as insured by) the Ministry of National Education’s circular on 
foreigners’ access to education (No 2014/21) issued in September 2014 (and have) 
access to educational services delivered through schools and temporary education 
centres overseen by the provincial education directorate in each province” (UNHCR 
FAQ 2015), Syrian refugee children face a detrimental language barrier (Nielsen and 
Grey 2013) that prevents them from excelling amongst their peers. To alleviate the 
challenges of language, Syrian schools have opened across the city of Gaziantep for 
refugee children in primary and secondary grades (Nielsen and Grey 2013).  
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Nielsen and Grey (2013) indicate additional problems Syrian refugees face in 
Turkey, including the restriction of using a hijab or headscarf at school and the lack of 
gender-homogenous classrooms. Syrian youth may apply to attend Turkish universities, 
provided that they satisfy language and academic requirements. The Council of 
Ministers announced that tuition fees for Syrian students would be waived for the 
2014/2015 academic year for State universities. However, language once again becomes 
a core disadvantage for young Syrian adults wishing to attend academic programs at 
universities, but have neither, working knowledge in Turkish nor English. In addition to 
the educational disadvantages that Syrians experience as refugees, the Turkish 
community has accused them of “stealing educational opportunities from Turkish 
students” at the university level (Özden 2013, p. 8).  
Syrian parents expressed skepticism in the educational programs available to 
Syrian children in Turkey and instead are in favor of Syrian-led schools in cities like 
Gaziantep even if they are not in par to their standards. An interviewee expresses these 
concerns in the excerpt below: 
I don’t think that the education is high, or I don’t think if my husband still in 
his work at that time and we could easily put our children in the school or 
something. Every day they make new laws for Syrians. I think a lot of people 
put their children here in Syrian schools, but this Syrians schools is not just 
like a real school, it’s like a smaller school. It’s like a daycare center, it 
learn them something, but not as a real school in Syria. There’s free and 
there’s private (schools), it’s not worthy as a Syrian school. (4) 
 
The European Commission for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection states that 
“more than half of the refugees in Turkey are children” and according to UNICEF “74% 
of refugee children without an educational system “are at risk of becoming a lost 
generation” (ECHO 2016). Educational leaders in Turkey like Enver Yücel emphasize 
the need to assimilate marginalized people like Syrian refugees into the educational 
system, explaining that a person’s lack of education becomes “easy recruits for 
extremists” (Amos 2015). Yücel is among the few entrepreneurs in Turkey to invest in 
long-term initiatives for Syrian refugees by targeting the educational opportunities 
through his proposal that would allocate $10 million for the construction of universities 
for Syrians. He also claims that “Syrians are now permanent residents and have changed 
Turkey’s social fabric” (Amos 2015). However, Syrians interviewed for this thesis 
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believe otherwise, they see Turkey as “transitional” (1), a stopping point on the road 
from war-torn Syria towards a better life westward in Europe. 
On the other hand, Turkey’s Ministry of National Education announced that at 
the beginning of the school year in 2016, students in elementary school will be able to 
choose Arabic as an elective course (Çetingüleç 2015). Although the introduction of a 
new language within the education sector seems as a positive move towards the 
integration of Syrians into the Turkish community as well as the employment of Syrian 
refugees as instructors, the Turkish public has reacted negatively. Çetingüleç (2015) 
explains that the main criticisms of Arabic as a second language derive from the 
Turkish public’s backlash at “AKP’s fanatic desire to indoctrinate Arabic into the 
Turkish system because of it’s ‘holy’ ties to Islam, the dissolution of Ataturk’s 
‘alphabet revolution’ in Latin, to ‘assassinate secularism’, attaining future votes for its 
party from Syrians who become citizens” (Çetingüleç 2016), and the competition for 
teaching jobs. 
 
 
 
4.3 Key Findings 
 
 
 
To conclude this chapter, analyzing the assimilation of Syrian refugees into 
Turkey required a considerate amount of research to understand the complexity behind 
the formation of attitudes as a result of social treatment. Overall, the conditions that 
Syrian refugees are experiencing in Turkey indicate sentiments related to resentment, 
isolation, discrimination, exclusion, and deprivation. The traumas experienced by 
Syrians in their home country as a result of the revolution and in Turkey as transitional 
refugees reveal feelings of resentments, hopelessness, and disappointment towards a 
country they assumed was traditionally and culturally similar to Syria. Although Syrian 
respondents expected an easy transition into Turkey because of religion, customs, 
traditions, food, family dynamics, geographical proximity, and architecture, an easy 
transition has been further from feasible. These last excerpts express the feelings of 
disappointment: 
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I may say that in here we may saw mosques, we may saw Muslims, I think 
it’s tiny (of importance), it’s a different culture, a whole different culture 
from us. But here in Turkey, people are unfriendly, you know, I think I lived 
here two years, I just know my neighbor outdoor, just this (Turkish) person. 
And it’s really miserable for Syrians and there’s no law protecting Syrians 
or give them home for free, or something easier for live. (4) 
 
In Urfa I found they were really rude to Syrians, they blackmail us in words, 
in the treatment, like in the bus sometimes they talk to us in a loud voice, 
this is rude for us, I mean. And I didn’t really, I weren’t comfortable at 
Urfa, at all. That Urfa, there are lots of Syrians there and Turkish people 
it’s like half of them speak Arabic in difficulty but they speak Arabic. In my 
opinion, they should be more close to us, because they have some Arabic 
and some traditions they have, we’ve got. So, but I didn’t know why they’re 
treatment was this way. But a lot of Syrians, I may say, Syrians do bad 
things that make us all in this situation, they look at us that we are like this. 
(4) 
   
It definitely looks like Syria. This part of Turkey (Gaziantep) but it’s 
actually not. The streets, the building’s. When I walk down the streets here I 
feel kind of nostalgic, when you wake up it’s not the same. (2) 
 
When respondents were asked if they would partake in any protesting 
movements in response to the treatment of Syrians in Turkey, they expressed feelings of 
fear. Traumas rooted in their past political activism in Syria, the intimidation to the 
current limitations on having a voice in Turkey, and the trepidation of possible 
deportation are all significant factors impeding major protests organized by Syrian 
refugees. Wiktorowicz highlighted that “where there are high risks and costs involved,” 
(Wiktorowicz 2004, p. 20), individuals are hesitant to partake in radical movements and 
instead will partake in “low-risk, low-cost activism” (Wiktorowicz 2004, p.21) which is 
taking form through social media networks.  
Hornqvist and Flyghed (2012) emphasize the need to focus on “perceived 
injustices” regardless whether or not they are factual (p. 329). If Syrians correlate their 
experiences in Turkey with “social exclusion, unemployment, a lack of integration, and 
a breakdown of common values” (p. 327), the literature on radicalization would suggest 
that they are on the pathway of radicalization. However, Syrian refugees attribute the 
aforementioned experiences and grievances to the Turkish public; while on the other 
spectrum, they express gratitude and commendation to the Turkish government for 
hosting them. This divide in the Syrians refugee experience is particularly important 
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because it serves as a balancing force whereby the injustices by the Turkish public are 
harmonized by the role of the Turkish government.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6:  IDENTITY 
 
 
 
 
If I wanted to define myself as a refugee, I would have gone to Germany. I 
don’t want that. I want to be the same person, Syrian or not. I want to be a 
person who has rights, who can work, sleep, eat, have a social life, just like 
anyone else. It is quite hard being a Syrian. But if you work hard enough, I 
believe I can achieve it. (2) 
 
Hornqvist and Flyghed claim that individuals who become recruited to radical 
organizations “are not drawn from the lower strata of society, nor are they primarily 
motivated by a sense of injustice, instead, it is a question of identity” (Hornqvist and 
Flyghed 2012, p. 325). As Wiktorowicz (2004) puts it “identity crisis is critical for 
recruitment”. In an excerpt of a Syrian refugee I interviewed, the individual expressed 
his sense of loss in identity:  
A year or two ago I was quite depressed ‘cause I’m a type of a man who 
likes to think five steps ahead, and if I can’t I just get confused, so when the 
war started I can’t even think two minutes ahead. So, it was quite 
depressing. (2) 
 
Wiktorowicz explains how pivotal the process of identity construction is as “the 
vehicle of recruitment and joining” into radical groups with “networks of shared 
meaning” (Wiktorowicz 2004, p. 11). The concept of shared meanings can be quite 
simple, from the narratives depicting the plight of Syrian refugees or living in a country 
less conservative than their own. As Magnus Ranstorp suggests, the “deterritorialization 
of Islam and a sense of ‘global grievance’” among other narratives, serve as “‘tipping 
points’ into violence” (Ranstorp 2009, p. 3). 
Wendy Pearlman’s research across Turkey and Lebanon identified four different 
fears that Syrians exhibited during their country’s revolution: silencing, surmounted, 
semi-normalized, and nebulous fear (Pearlman 2016) Pearlman defines silencing fear as 
the “submission to their (autocratic leaders’) coercive authority” (p. 24) and a “rational 
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strategy for survival” (p. 25) when punishment over political transgression is feasible. 
Therefore, I argue that Syrians in Turkey are, like in Syria, exposed to a new level of 
silencing fear, whereby relocation to a refugee camp, deportation, imprisonment, or 
even loss of employment are possible forms of punishment that hinder refugee’s 
likelihood to protest their current circumstances and perceived relative deprivation.  
Commonalities among refugees as they come to understand their new identity 
and revisit the traumas and grievances associated to life in Turkey is particularly 
significant in understanding the initial stages of radicalization. Wiktorowicz attributes 
importance to the preliminary stages of interest in participating in radicalized ideologies 
and movements by arguing that “cognitive opening and religious seeking do not 
guarantee even initial participation” and instead, what is crucial at the initial level is 
whether the “movement message…resonates with individual perceptions and 
understandings of the world” (Wiktorowicz 2004, p. 18). 
A common theme among radicalized individuals is the experience of a “severe 
identity crisis prior to their initial stages of participation” (Wiktorowicz 2004, p. 14). 
When we look at the case of Syrians prior to their life in Turkey, there is no doubt that 
the war in Syria alone has reconstructed their identity and this process has continued to 
as long as they remained in zones of conflict. Even with the benefits that Syrians 
receive as temporary protection beneficiaries in Turkey, the lack of educational and 
work opportunities coupled with the social stigma of being labeled as a “refugee” does 
not fade. The ways in which Syrians perceive their experience in Turkey and as the 
literature shows that feelings of ostricization and discrimination can lead to radical 
ideologies. In an interview conducted by Wiktorowicz with an al-Muhajiroun member, 
the radicalized individual asserted that “despite the fact that you have just as many 
qualifications as the next man and gone to the same universities, there is still a feeling 
that you are disadvantaged or people are still discriminating against you. And those 
kinds of obstacles have pushed people to reevaluate their ideology, their culture” 
(2004). 
The individuals interviewed identified themselves as politically-driven civil 
activists as a result of the revolution and the tragedies of war that continued thereinafter. 
Now a Syrian’s identity is stamped on as a refugee in Turkey, even though before this 
stage, they were civil activists during Syria’s revolution, and even before then 
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university students thinking about career paths. Among the 11 factors that Mastors and 
Siers identify as triggering factors for radicalization, Syrian refugees satisfy over half, 
including frustration, economic misery, humiliation, need for belonging, personal crisis, 
moral outrage, quest for personal significance, and perceived injustice (Mastors and 
Siers 2014, p. 378). 
Having undergone at least three major identity crises, Syrian refugees would be 
deemed vulnerable for the recruitment into radical ideologies that can provide “logical 
solutions to pressing concerns” (Wiktorowicz 2004, p. 9). The concerns that Syrians 
experience in Turkey are related to what Wiktorowicz refers to as the “severity of the 
cognitive opening” or how intensely Syrian refugees are reflecting and reassessing their 
lives in Turkey in relation to their belief system and identity (Wiktorowicz 2004, p. 10). 
The instability in terms of income, employment, and education make individuals 
susceptible to radical ideologies within any of these pillars.  
Exposed to the interpretations of life from their families and those surrounding 
them, the potential for recruitment in Turkey among the Syrian refugee youth is a very 
real risk as more than half of the refugees living in Turkey’s camps are under 18 years 
of age (Daily Sabah 2016b). The role of “group comparison” plays an important role on 
how Syrians perceive their social identity in Turkey in terms of “in-groups and out-
groups” (Mastors and Siers, 2014. p. 379). 
As social identity theory presents, Syrian refugees are represented as the in-
group, whereas, Turkish society is the out-group; thus, the “suffering of the in-group 
(is) at the hands of the out-group.” The interpretation of this otherization by Syrian 
refugees in Turkey is vital as it serves to remove responsibility and guilt associated to 
believing in and performing radical acts against the culprit or the out-group who is 
labeled as “the enemy” and “less than human” (Mastors and Siers 2014, p. 379). With 
the violent incidents between Syrian refugees and Turks mentioned in the above 
chapters, the enemy in Syrian’s eyes is not necessarily the government of Turkey, but 
the community of Turkish people.  
Finally, as “transformative radicalization suggests similar cognitive shifts occur 
in radicalizing individuals, whereby previously held conceptions, beliefs, and 
identities—along with their associated behaviors—are reconstructed and replaced 
(Wilner and Douboulouz 2011, p. 419). These cognitive shifts were exhibited by the 
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interviews conducted with Syrian refugees as they explored the sorts of experiences in 
Turkey and how their previously held belief systems is incongruent with their current 
ones.  
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CHAPTER 7:  CONCLUDING ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
With radicalization sprouting across the globe, the international community 
wants more answers as to how radical ideas emerge and how these ideas transform into 
violent radical actions. The next contemporary threat to the international community 
could have been the Syrian refugee crisis in Turkey as it possesses the elements that 
would current literature indicates for the formation of violent radical action. However, 
the Syrian refugee case in Turkey has not.  
To recapitulate, the stories of Syrian refugees in Turkey were captured through 
the use of a semi-structured interview format which allowed Syrians to share their 
experience in an open-ended format guided by a set of questions. Throughout this 
research I connected Syrian’s attitudes related to living in Turkey with the role of social 
media, Turkey’s political turmoil, the Turkish government and society, legal statuses 
and educational and employment opportunities, among others. The overall aim of this 
research was to contribute innovative work to the ongoing discourse on radicalization 
within the international arena by analyzing the case of Syrian refugees in Turkey.  
According to the findings in the interviews, Syrians’ discontent with the Assad 
regime ultimately led to their participation in political activism during the revolution in 
Syria. In Turkey, they seek to continue their goal of fulfilling their “duty” in political 
activism in Turkey for Syria.  The grievances Syrians experienced in their home country 
led them, by definition, to engage in radical behavior because it was a direct “threat to 
their (Assad regime’s) continued control of state power” (Sedgwick 2010, p. 487).  
Although Syrian refugees continue to exhibit feelings rooted in fear from their 
experiences in Syria, they are now exposed to new dimensions of fear in Turkey’s 
shifting political landscape. Syrians, though exposed to social and economic grievances 
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in Turkey, are not compelled to engage in political activism, primarily because they feel 
their status as temporary protection beneficiaries does not guarantee them the freedom 
to demand more rights. Additionally, even though the Syrians I interviewed continue to 
lead politically active lives in Turkey, they dedicate their desire for activism to working 
for Syrian-based NGOs as either contractors, volunteers, or translators in peace-building 
initiatives for Syria. Actively interacting with Turkish and foreign individuals in the 
same NGOs exposes Syrian refugees to a community that shares similar interests in 
activism. Thus, the availability for Syrian refugees in Turkey to participate in legal 
activism within these NGOs perhaps plays an important role in hindering them from 
engaging in radical practices. 
Another important finding in the interviews conducted for this thesis is that 
Syrian refugees expressed an important division in interpreting their experiences in 
Turkey. At one end, being admitted into Turkey is congruent with feelings of gratitude 
for admittance, while at the other end, uncertainty for their future. Özden provides this 
account when one of his interviewee expressed this frustration by stating, “we are in 
between two fires in Turkey. As displaced people we are in a vulnerable situation so we 
cannot voice our complaints to the Turkish authorities. Because we do not have refugee 
status they can decide to deport us at any time” (Özden 2013, p. 7). These claims by 
Syrians living inside Turkey contradict the policies inherent to Syrians admitted into the 
country. 
Yet another notable finding was made while conducting interviews to 
understand how Syrian refugees distinguish and interpret their experiences in Turkey. 
When referring to their experiences, the responses drastically split between two 
significant dimensions: the government of Turkey led by Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) and that of Turkey’s civil society. It’s crucial to distinguish 
specifically AKP’s role in the Syrian perception as a body of protection and admission 
to the refugees. The divide found during the interviewing sessions deserves more 
research to understand the role of AKP and Syrian refugees because if Syrian refugees 
attain the right to vote in Turkey they can drastically affect voter turnout. The political 
perceptions of the refugees swayed in support of AKP, expressing positive attitudes 
associated with gratitude, respect, benevolence, and praise. At the other end of the 
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spectrum, the refugee’s feelings towards Turkey’s civil society were expressed as those 
in relation to antagonism (3), disconnection (4), rejection (1), and resentment (2).  
In conclusion, Syrian refugees in Turkey are faced with serious cases of 
discrimination and are experiencing severe social isolation from the Turkish society 
which has led to the development of resentments. The findings from the interviews I 
conducted for this thesis contradict the theories on radicalization because Syrian 
refugees would like to become a part of Turkey’s society as one interviewee stated “I 
think most Syrians would like to stay here because Turkey is really not that different 
from our culture, it’s really, there are lots of connections” (1). However, Syrian 
refugees do want improvements in terms of status, employment, education, and social 
treatment even if they do not express these sentiments openly to the Turkish 
government and public. 
All in all, the lack of concrete transitional programs in Turkey has resulted in a 
maladaptation of Syrian refugees to Turkish society and led to personal traumas and 
conflicts associated to assimilation in Turkey. These experiences have developed 
sentiments that are a direct byproduct of the failure of the Turkish government and 
society to provide refugees with an easy transition into the host country. The lack of 
these formal and concrete programs do not necessarily result from a lack of attention to 
detail but from a rhetoric of the Turkish public and government that sees Syrians as 
temporary guests. Syrians interviewed for this thesis exhibited attitudes that entailed 
traumas, grievances, discrimination, resentment, isolation, frustration at unemployment, 
and lack of educational opportunities, but they are not propelled to develop radical 
ideologies and actions despite the current literature that would suggest so.  
Therefore, I cannot claim that Syrian refugees in Turkey are radicalized based 
on the existing literature on radicalization because the experiences expressed to me in 
interviews exhibit resentments on how media portrays them, the lack of integration into 
Turkish society, traumas and grievances in Syria and Turkey, and identity crises but the 
individuals did not radicalize. Instead, the context in which Syrian refugees have found 
themselves socially and economically has not become a hot bed for the for 
radicalization in Turkey. As Veldhuis and Staun (2009) suggest, the experiences that 
Syrian refugees are undergoing may just lead to peaceful social movements or to no 
movements at all.  
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APPENDICES 
 
 
 1.1 Interviews 
(1) Interviews with A.A, Istanbul, Turkey, 2015 
(2) Interviews with M.A., Gaziantep, Turkey, 2016 
(3) Interviews with A.I., Gaziantep, Turkey, 2016 
(4) Interviews with Z.A, Gaziantep, Turkey, 2016 
(5) Interviews with A., Istanbul, Turkey, 2016 
1.2 Interview questions 
 
1. Tell me a little bit about yourself. 
2. What is your age? 
3. How many children do you have? 
4. How long have you been married? 
5. Where did you get married? 
6. What religious body do you associate yourself with? 
7. How do you feel about living in Turkey? 
8. Your spouse? 
9. What are your hobbies/interests? 
10. Is this a place you’d want your children to grow up in? why? 
11. How are Syrians being treated in Turkey? 
12. If Syrians continue to be treated in this way, what for you, would be just? 
How can Syrians receive justice? 
13. What do you feel about Western involvement in the region? 
14. Turkey’s involvement in the region? 
15. Have you changed since the war? How? 
16. What needs to be done in Syria? 
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17. Would you engage in any political activity in the future? 
18. Have your ideas on life changed during your time in Turkey? 
19. How have you changed since the revolution started in Syria? Arrived in 
Turkey? 
20. How would you describe your integration into Turkey? 
21. How would you describe your life in Turkey? 
22. Is there a specific moment you can think of that crystallizes your 
experience in Turkey thus far? How was that like? 
23. What sorts of emotions do you tie to being a Syrian living in Turkey? Do 
you think other Syrians living in Turkey would agree with you? 
Disagree? 
24. How did you feel when you arrived in Turkey? 
25. Can you tell about an incident that occurred with a Turkish person? 
26. How do you feel today living in Turkey? 
27. Has anything changed? 
28. How would you describe your relationship with Turkish people? 
29. Do you consider yourself as assimilated or accepted in Turkey? Why? 
30. How do you reflect on your life here in Turkey? 
31. What do you think your children would go through if they continued 
living in Turkey? 
32. Is this the kind of society you want to live in? Bring up your children? 
33. Do you feel that you belong to this society? 
34. Does Turkish society need to change for Syrian refugees? 
35. If you stayed in Turkey for a long time, what would you do differently? 
What would you change? 
36. Is there anything in Turkey that makes you feel part of the society? 
37. Any individuals or groups or places that you go to find comfort in from 
living in Turkey? 
38. What do you do on your free time? 
39. How do you feel about how Turkish media is portraying Syrians?  
40. International media? 
41. What do you feel about the Turkish education system for Syrians? 
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42. What would you say is your identity now in Turkey? 
43. Is there any experience that you want to talk about since we last spoke? 
44. What sorts of changes have occurred since our last conversation? 
45. Could you tell me a little bit more about your social life in Turkey? 
46. How do you feel about your integration into Turkey? 
47. What do you think about Syrians’ legal status now in Turkey? 
48. What do you think about how the media portrays refugees? 
49. What are you doing in your free time? 
50. What do you think is the biggest problem Syrians face in Turkey? 
51. What do you want for your future? 
52. What do you think about the situation that’s going on in Syria? 
53. What do you think about the EU-Turkey agreements involving Syrian 
refugees? 
54. Are there any events or issues that you think of as important about your 
life that we left out? 
 
